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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE CONSENT OF MAN: AN EXAMINATION OF PRIVACY AWARENESS,
SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY POLICY (MIS)USE
The problem of privacy is nuanced, pervasive, and requires an elevated approach.
Given the lack of consistency with regard to privacy’s conceptualization and
operationalization, research is needed that examines variables related to privacy to better
understand how privacy operates in the present day. This dissertation aims to better
understand nuances of privacy by gauging knowledge of online privacy, technological
affordances related to privacy, and knowledge of surveillance. In this study, human
subjects from a large southern University were presented with an opportunity to use a
privacy-invasive smartphone application. After doing so, they viewed one of three
privacy policies. Finally, they answered survey items measuring privacy awareness and
surveillance awareness.
It was found that there were no significant main effects between modality of
privacy policy shown and awareness of privacy nor awareness of surveillance. However,
significant individual differences were found between two types of privacy policies. It
was also found that a significant and positive relationship existed between awareness of
privacy, and awareness of surveillance. It was also found that a relationship existed
between awareness of privacy and awareness of the communication affordances of
visibility and encryption. The present study concludes with implications that benefit
communication theory, social media research, and legal bodies who seek to address
issues with present day privacy policies.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Problem of Privacy
Congratulations! If you are reading this document, then you have, at some point, given

away your privacy. You most certainly have done so when you browsed the Internet on May 25,
2018, and were presented with a new privacy policy and/or terms of service (ToS) agreement on
every single website you visited because of the implementation and enforcement of the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (Jeong, 2018). Were the terms of service too long or
confusing? Did you want to dismiss the notification that popped up on the screen? Did you just
not care enough? Did you want access to your brand-new iPhone? Regardless of the reason,
checking the “I Agree” button gave away your privacy and holds significant implications for you
as a user. Furthermore, you are probably not the only person who has done this.
Every day, millions of young adults use their devices to log onto seemingly innocuous
social media platforms that collect large amounts of data from these users (e.g., Facebook,
TikTok; Fowler, 2020). These same individuals are also eager to adopt new technologies (e.g.,
Amazon Alexa) that store individuals’ voices, home addresses, and other personal details while
also containing significant security flaws (Doffman, 2020b). When these users are asked about
their online privacy, they claim to be both knowledgeable and concerned about their data. Yet,
they fail to take any initiatives to protect themselves. The general concern that people express in
the face of known online privacy risks is known as the as the privacy paradox (Barnes, 2006).
Knowing that the average user is the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain (Culp, 2016), it is
possible that communication theory could explain and/or hypothesize behaviors associated with
the privacy paradox. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Communication theory lacks a cohesive
explanation for the privacy paradox with regard to how privacy is practiced in the status quo as
well as the extent to which one gives their privacy away. Is this paradox a problem of our
environment, culture, or something else? Data being given away freely in the status quo and this
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is largely due to how users and adopters of technology mismanage their privacy. Thus, the time is
now for scholars to reconsider what kinds of variables, be it technological or behavioral, could be
related to one’s willingness to give their privacy away.
The privacy paradox and related privacy mismanagement behaviors are indeed a problem
that communication scholarship may be uniquely positioned to explore. New technologies are
introduced and adopted on massive scales, specifically those that are data-driven and request a
significant amount of data from their users. An opportunity exists to reconsider the problem of
privacy from a perspective that considers both individual differences of technology users and
affordances embedded in the technologies themselves.
The present study makes note of the shortcomings of communication theory and proposes
the notion of mediated privacy, an understated concept in the field, which functions as an
extension of hallmark privacy theories (e.g., Altman, 1975, 1977) as well as Petronio’s (2002)
communication privacy management. In this vein, the current research elevates the concept of
privacy as one being a cultural concept, involving technological and communicative affordances,
as well as associated with contemporary surveillance. By elevating privacy in this fashion, it may
be possible to explain and address the privacy paradox. The present study avoids contributing to
discourse involving the life/death of privacy. Instead, this study shifts the goalposts away from
attempting to predict privacy protection in the status quo and is centered in a reality where
individuals have haphazardly given their data away and assumes that they will continue to do so.
The present study seeks to understand the specific extent one gives their data privacy away to
access a new technology by focusing on technological affordances, awareness of privacy, and
modalities of privacy policies.
The novel Coronavirus (COVID-19; Feibus, 2020) and the implementation of
surveillance applications on college campuses (e.g., SpotterEDU; Harwell, 2019; Schwarz, 2020)
indicate that new media technologies and contemporary social issues hold the potential to start
conversations regarding privacy. Given the exigence of these issues in tandem with the privacy
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paradox, the present study asks college students to report on their privacy habits and awareness to
better understand the extent privacy is given away.

3

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW, HYPOTHESES, AND RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
2.1

Overview
In a time where privacy is valued as being worthy of concern, yet knowingly and

willingly given away, answering questions related to the extent to which someone gives their
privacy away is marred by misconceptions and outdated suppositions related to what privacy is as
well as assumptions regarding how privacy functions in the status quo. Knowing this is an exigent
issue within the literature as well as contemporary human behavior, the purpose of this
dissertation is twofold. First, this dissertation seeks to decenter privacy away from its offline roots
of being a human-centric unit of study and into a territory where privacy is information-centric
and in a constant state of being given away. Second, this dissertation seeks to understand how
technological affordances of the privacy consent process and individual difference variables
might be related to one another and be catalysts for people keeping (and knowingly giving away)
their privacy. This should lead to a better understanding of the conditions that surround decisions
related to privacy decisions and a better understanding of privacy in general. Ultimately, this
dissertation offers insight into the extent to which users might give away their privacy when
offered a chance to use a new technology (a practice that has become rather common in today’s
society).

2.2

On Defining (and Theorizing) a Theory of Privacy
The concept of privacy is rooted in a premise involving offline communication

interactions, human stakeholders, and an equal distribution of power between these stakeholders.
Multiple scholars have argued that the concept of privacy is a human process (Altman, 1975,
1977), a communication tactic (Petronio, 2002), and a human right (Papacharissi, 2010; Sayre &
Dahling, 2016; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). These conceptualizations are important in that they
contain the necessary theoretical framework for discussing offline interactions, yet they fall short

in framing contemporary communication phenomena involving privacy practices. Before I can
explain this criticism, it is imperative to review these theories of privacy and their
conceptualizations.
Some of the earlier conceptualizations of privacy define it as a communicative act that
lacks intent, structure, and direction. Westin (1967) defines privacy as “the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others” (p. 7). This description is framed around an individual
limiting themselves from being accessed by others but does not explicitly link this act as one
being driven by an intent to be secretive. Altman’s (1975, 1977) definition, like Westin’s, lacks
an intent yet still describes a human behavior of selectively controlling an other’s access to the
self. If one is to frame privacy using either of these two definitions, they would have to exclude
an element of communicative strategy when discussing what is, and could be, private.
Privacy has also been defined as a human right. Legal interpretations of privacy frame it
as a right to be left alone (see Warren & Brandeis, 1890). In contemporary research, framing
privacy as a human right has informed public policy on information regulation (Such & Rovatsos,
2016; Youn et al., 2014) and data collection (Malala, 2016; Shilton, 2009). However, like the
theories of privacy from Altman and Westin, privacy as a human right is often overlooked in
favor of privacy within interpersonal communication settings, such as Petronio’s (2002)
communication privacy management.
Petronio’s (2002, 2013) communication privacy management (CPM) is a hallmark theory
used to guide privacy in an interpersonal setting. In that vein, privacy in interpersonal settings is a
communication tactic, involving a process of constructing boundaries, revealing information, as
well as the extent to which those boundaries are managed by information stakeholders. Privacy,
then, is “the feeling that one has the right to own privacy information, either personally or
collectively” (Petronio, 2002, p. 6). Research using this conceptualization has involved
understanding the boundaries of friendships (Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2012), infertility
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disclosures (Steuber & Solomon, 2012), e-commerce (Metzger, 2007), and a willingness to allow
increased government surveillance (Rulffes, 2017). CPM has also been used to guide research on
social media users and their (lack of) privacy online, such as the kinds of content individuals are
willing to share with others on their social media feeds (Ampong et al., 2018; Child et al., 2012;
Choi & Bazarova, 2015; Ellison et al., 2011; Quinn, 2016), how identities are managed through
using social media (Livingstone, 2008), as well as awareness of privacy in online settings (David
& James, 2013; Shreeves, 2015). At its core, CPM is valuable for communication research
because it details the human communication processes related to practicing privacy, how
information should be shared between human actors, as well as how privacy influences
interpersonal communication concepts (e.g., maintaining relationships). However, there are
multiple limitations (i.e., assumptions) regarding interpreting privacy solely as a human right, a
communication tactic, and a communication act lacking intent.
First, contemporary privacy theories are imprecise in their powers to explain what
privacy is as well as what privacy could be in mediated settings. In other words, these theories
fail to account for how privacy is practiced in social media between data owners (i.e., social
media users) and data controllers (i.e., social media platforms). The notion of the disproportionate
relationship between data controllers and data owners might be missing from communication
theory, but it can be contextualized using an example of contemporary data sharing. Consider an
agreement that a social media user reviews before being given permission to access the platform.
The user is presented with a lengthy privacy policy with a checkbox that indicates their
understanding of and agreement with this policy. While this scenario is technically one that is not
compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR; for a review of the GDPR, see
General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR], 2016), it is a scenario that contrasts with Petronio’s
(2002) second and third suppositions of CPM involving the creating and maintaining of privacy
boundaries as well as controlling and owning private information.
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The second supposition of CPM states that, while privacy boundaries can be
differentiated depending on who is involved as well as the type of information being regulated
(i.e., shared), the ambiguous or clear lines of ownership are usually dependent on who is
responsible for the information being shared (Petronio, 2002). For the case of the aforementioned
example, this would mean that the user would still be responsible for their data long after
enacting the privacy policy. This is not the case in the status quo as the data owner becomes
responsible for that data being held secure. Furthermore, the data owner’s presentation of the
privacy policy determines which information is private and public information that could be at
odds with the user’s presupposed idea of what is and should be private. Although CPM lightly
accounts for this discrepancy in the form of boundaries shifting over time as one ages, it does not
account for the decrease of a privacy boundary because of a nonhuman entity’s (i.e., a data
controller’s) influence over determining what is considered to be private data.
The third supposition of CPM states that due to an individual need to exercise and
maintain control, one manages that control through the regulation of the boundaries described in
the second supposition. In other words, when one shares information with another, both parties
become mutual co-owners of that private information, both with different sets of responsibilities
involving that private information (Petronio, 2002). For the case of the aforementioned example
involving the data owner and data controller, the relationship between the two would involve a
mutual creation of privacy boundaries, protection of, and a stake in the mutual maintenance of
that information remaining private. However, this does not occur in the status quo because of an
imbalance of power that exists between data controllers and data owners. Data controllers such as
Facebook create the boundaries for future information that they will co-own; the users who
partake in that privacy policy have no choice in modifying that policy (MacKinnon, 2012). Either
the user agrees to all of the privacy boundaries set by the data controller who does not co-own the
information yet, or they are not allowed to access the platform. This problematic dichotomy holds
the user hostage in their decision-making; research should be concerned with how this might
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impact our considerations of privacy going forward. Although human communication research
has little concerned itself with legal scenarios involving terms of service between human and
nonhuman entities, it should given how privacy is created, maintained, and enforced within the
status quo.
The second shortcoming of privacy theories is their inability to account for contemporary
privacy problems: the privacy paradox and the personalization paradox. These two paradoxes
have manifested themselves into problematic influences on mediated human behavior.
The privacy paradox is the end-result of lax users who have become the weakest link of
an online security chain connecting concerned citizens to their data. It can best be described as a
disconnection between users’ privacy attitudes and their resultant online behaviors (Barnes, 2006;
Quinn, 2016). Specifically, the paradox can occur when social media users who have checked the
box of an overly complicated and verbose privacy policy report concerns with their online
privacy while simultaneously handing over their data to a social media platform just to get access.
While this could be argued to be an extension of users fearing government surveillance and
omnipresent data collection (6 et al., 1998), this issue is exigent because of how it is a risk
involving social media use, data security, and the protection of users’ rights (i.e., their right to
privacy).
Like the behavioral contradictions found in the privacy paradox, the personalization
paradox also involves privacy attitudes and behaviors in mediated settings. It can best be
described as the contradiction occurring when individuals report their concerns with advertisers
and their resultant advertisements knowing too much while also reporting a desire for targeted
advertisements that suit their interests (Aguirre et al., 2015). Although the fields of marketing,
persuasion, and commerce are most concerned with this paradox because of its association with
profit and user engagement (Bragg et al., 2019; Crano et al., 2017; Grier & Kumanyika, 2010;
Johnson, 2013, Kim et al., 2019; Kox et al., 2017), it is worth referencing given its association
with the privacy paradox. While this paradox is less exigent in that it frames users as those
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wanting their privacy invaded for an ideally unique service, it still highlights a clear, common,
and present privacy violation that has invaded present-day society.
The existence of these paradoxes in the status quo threaten the applicability of CPM as a
theory capable of explaining and predicting a contemporary exigent issue such as the privacy
paradox (and to a lesser extent, the personalization paradox). Through the lens of CPM, an
individual constructs their own privacy rules and boundaries, allowing for greater control over
how third parties might have access to that data, as well as how they experience privacy
turbulence when a co-owner mismanages the private information (Petronio, 2002, 2013). A data
breach is an example of contemporary privacy turbulence between a data controller (e.g., Internet
service provider [ISP], social media company) and a data owner resulting from the privacy
paradox. Under CPM, when a data breach occurs, the data owner would expect the data controller
to explain themselves regarding why the breach occurred as well as a clear explanation regarding
what kind of non-authorized third party had access to that private information. However, neither
occur in the status quo. Data owners have few opportunities to determine which third parties see
their data after they share it with a data controller, nor do data controllers have an obligation to go
beyond the bare minimum to discuss the specific impacts of that data breach (Mayeda, 2016;
Zajko, 2018). Thus, CPM cannot explain the lack of control users have over their own data as
well as the dis-proportionate relationship between contemporary co-owners of private information
(i.e., data owners and data controllers).
The two aforementioned examples (i.e., the irresponsible social media user clicking I
Agree without reading through a privacy policy and data breaches) are too common in the status
quo. Yet, existing communication theory lacks an ability to address these contemporary issues.
This does not mean that CPM nor any other pre-existing privacy theory should be used to explain
human communication. Rather, these theories are invaluable because of their power in describing
human-centered and (mainly) offline privacy practices (Margulis, 1977, 2003; Petronio, 2013).
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This also does not mean that privacy research should be atheoretical. Instead, the time is now to
approach understanding privacy from the extent to which we give it away.
What should the definition and theory of privacy be, then? Given the shortcomings of
previous conceptualizations of privacy, as well as the limitations of its existent theories, it is
imperative to decenter the concept away from being a human-centric concept and instead treat it
as an information-centric concept that exists in both physical and mediated spaces. Having an
understanding of what privacy is provides us with a greater understanding of how it functions in
the status quo. Revisiting the problem of privacy would elevate its uniqueness out of a territory
where similar terms dilute its meaning and contribute toward further confusion associated with
the contested concept that is privacy (Margulis, 1977, 2003). While the purpose of this
dissertation is not to redefine privacy through revisiting theoretical tenets associated with privacyrelated behaviors, a definition that accounts for problematic privacy practices is necessary for
understanding the foundations of the present study. Thus, I define privacy as a mediated and
intentional state of being where one has the right to conceal information so long as they remain
in control of said information. A good theory of privacy, then, would be one that is parsimonious
(Littlejohn, 2009), precise (Craig, 1996; Sandelands, 1990), synthesizable (Feyerabend, 1983),
and capable of being practiced (Craig, 1999). Finally, a good theory of privacy would keep in
mind the recommendations of prior scholars who have studied contemporary privacy.
Knowing the concept of privacy as a mediated concept (i.e., mediated privacy) and the
qualities of a “good” privacy theory, it is imperative to use these as a foundation for future
privacy research. Furthermore, it is also imperative to consider the recommendations made by
privacy scholars to advance the study of privacy to be as contemporary as those who practice it as
well as be relevant with what is considered to be privacy in the societal structures that bind us
together (i.e., policies). Thus, privacy should be embedded within an alternative context,
reconsidered in terms of the affordances associated with the concept, as well as associated as an
extension of contemporary surveillance and problematic media use behaviors.
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2.3

Privacy in Alternative Settings
Much of what we know about interpersonal privacy is at the individual and community

level. We are able to answer questions about micro- and mezzo-level variables relating to privacy
in online settings, namely on social media. To maintain their online privacy, users make
conscious decisions regarding what to share and withhold from others on their individual social
media profiles (Ampong et al., 2018; Child et al., 2012; Choi & Bazarova, 2015; Ellison et al.,
2011; Quinn, 2016). These decisions can be made at the content level (e.g., the types of pictures
to share on Instagram) and the network level (e.g., who to follow on social media). These same
users also use social media to strategically withhold their identities (Livingstone, 2008) and are
also generally cognizant of the concept of privacy in online settings (David & James, 2013;
Shreeves, 2015). Although this research is grounded in interpersonal communication research
processes relating to practicing privacy, it lacks a greater explanation beyond describing these
privacy practices.
At the mezzo-level, privacy research has highlighted how users construct their networks
while keeping privacy in mind. From this, we have an understanding regarding common trends
within specific demographics of users and their online friends as well as the processes related to
how and when an offline friend becomes an online friend (Child & Westermann, 2013; Yang,
2018; Yuan et al., 2013). This, too, describes the user as one who places considerable thought
into how their online networks are constructed in the short- and long-term, although making a
decision to give up one’s privacy in favor of an innovation is one that is made in the heat of the
moment (see Sundar et al., 2013). Maintaining privacy is often a justification for how users
construct their social networks, but not to the extent of ensuring that they are consistently
practicing privacy in a way that keeps it. For example, Yuan and colleagues (2013) discuss how
privacy (as both an interpersonal process as well as a form of political participation) on Chinese
social media has influenced norms and discussions regarding state surveillance and commercial
interests (i.e., data collection). Yet, these authors all but discuss how these privacy concerns were
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brought to the platform. In other words, how was a concern for maintaining and practicing
privacy instilled in these users prior to using Chinese social media? The easy answer to that
question is that it was outside of the scope of the authors’ study, but it is still worth answering for
a greater understanding of mediated privacy.
While knowledge of micro- and mezzo-level variables describe a user’s online behavior
in relation to privacy, it does not translate to predicting future behaviors involving protecting
privacy nor elaborating on root causes of impractical and irresponsible privacy maintenance. In
an op-ed on privacy research, boyd (2012) suggested that “we need to let go of our cultural
fetishization with the individual as the unit of analysis” (p. 350) by expanding privacy research to
be comprised of models, networks, and communities as the research subjects. While this is a
promising suggestion, the author lacks an explanation regarding what that looks like, as well as
how one is to operationalize this newer line of research. Knowing that privacy research has
focused extensively on multiple, yet outdated, levels, one such operationalization could be to
reconsider what we associate to be private when we use technology in an attempt to pivot to a
focus on micro-level variables in other theoretical contexts.
A reconsidered approach to privacy would be one where we consider privacy as a
derivative of a culture of complacency resulting from an overestimation and misuse of
affordances, or variables that are derived from long-term behaviors and/or impact a significantly
large number of users. Although common present-day mediated privacy issues were less
prevalent (if not absent from societal discourse) prior to 2000, 6 (1998) predicted privacy risks
(i.e., slow killers and avocational thrills) that ended up being commonplace in 2020, such as
injustices, violations, and biases related to financial data collection (e.g., credit card companies
and their decision making processes related to spending habits and/or socioeconomics; Crosman,
2020), the lack of personal control over the collection of personal information (e.g., Facebook’s
data collection and their resultant data breaches; Badshah, 2018), and privacy risks to dignity in
the form of being a public social media figure (e.g., social media influencer; Wakefield, 2019). In
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this vein, the privacy risks predicted by 6 (1998) have impacted millions of individuals for a long
period of time. Seeing that these risks are prevalent and unlikely to go away soon, it can be
assumed that the ways in which we practice privacy (knowing some, if not all, of these risks) are
derivative of our contemporary culture.
While interpersonal and other social scientific privacy research has not explicitly linked
an individual’s upbringing to privacy awareness and practices, there are few notable exceptions
which support this notion. First, Shin and colleagues (2012) found that tweens who circumvented
their parents’ Internet safeguarding measures likely overestimated their online invulnerability and
were more likely to engage in risky online behaviors. If this is the case for newer (and younger)
Internet users, then an argument can be made regarding newer generations creating and
perpetuating privacy-related risks that they eventually take into adulthood. Second, Cheung and
colleagues (2016) found that early adopters of cutting-edge health technologies (i.e., health
applications, genome sequencing, and wearable health devices) were willing to give their data
away to support scientific advancements yet were concerned about the potential privacy risks
(thus reinforcing the notion of the privacy paradox in health settings). If this is the case for users
who adopt technology at a later time (e.g., laggards), then an argument can be made regarding the
omnipresence of the privacy paradox in that it transcends traditional demographics (e.g., gender,
age, socioeconomic status) and instead impacts all users of new technologies and new
information-centric media (albeit, at varying stages depending on when one adopts a technology).
Users seem to really want the potential affordances of a new technology (even if it comes at the
cost of one’s privacy being invaded). Third, Sarabdeen and Moonesar (2017) found that although
there is no overarching e-health data privacy law in the UAE, citizens of Dubai reported a high
level of trust in their health care providers’ data-keeping and privacy practices. If this is the case
for other regions of the world with inconsistent (or outright absent) federal privacy legislation
(e.g., the United States), then an argument can be made regarding individuals expecting data
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controllers to protect the privacy of their data subjects. In other words, this culture of compliance
might be a result of one thinking that it is not their job to protect their own data.
A reconsideration of the problem of privacy portrays it as one of many scenarios, (1)
privacy is an issue related to time and scale (e.g., younger generations adopting lax privacy
practices and perpetuating them into adulthood), (2) privacy is an issue related to regional
practices and societal expectations (e.g., individuals knowing of specific individuals whose duty
is to protect privacy in a region where no such legal expectations exist) and/or (3) privacy is an
issue related to technological adoption (e.g., when one adopts a new technology, they will be
aware of the privacy risks but will prioritize the affordances of that new technology). If any of
these scenarios are true, then it can be assumed that ingrained behavioral values drive one to be
lax with their own privacy practices. Regardless of which of these scenarios hold water, users are
cognizant of their own mediated privacy yet fail to employ tactics to actually protect their
privacy. This is but one possible explanation for a lax user at protecting their own privacy;
perhaps an alternative explanation exists from the lens of an affordance perspective.

2.4

Considering Technological Affordances of Mediated Privacy
An affordance perspective might yield a clearer understanding of privacy in mediated

spaces. Gibson (1986) defined an affordance as “what it [an environment] offers an animal, what
it proves or furnishes” (p. 127). In more specific terms, affordances are human perceptions (i.e.,
their awareness) of an object’s utility drawn from environmental cues. A communicative
affordance, then, is “an interaction between subjective perceptions of utility and objective
qualities of the technology that alter communicative practices or habits” (Schrock, 2015, p. 1232).
As noted by Nye and Silverman (2012), affordances can also be considered dyadic relationships
between an agent and an object and include a body of study measuring awareness, simulation,
adaptation, and cognition. For the case of this study, one’s awareness of privacy is a key variable.
Communication research involving affordances has evolved beyond classifications and
typologies. Communication affordance literature includes, but is not limited to analyzing
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behaviors impacted by ICTs (Areepattamannil & Khine, 2017; Rice et al., 2017) granular social
media use (Aladwani, 2017; Bowman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2019), classifying media users
(Brandtztaeg, 2010; Karahanna et al., 2018), as well as discussing the communication discipline
(Vorderer, 2016). This research has demonstrated that the affordance perspective offers a wide
breadth of use cases for analyzing various communication phenomena. Including privacy in this
line of research would give privacy researchers the opportunity to decenter the concept of privacy
away from being a human-centric issue into an information-centric issue as well as understanding
how privacy is considered by media users (if at all) during an age where a great deal of human
behavior is mediated and involving non-human actors. Although privacy itself cannot be an
affordance (as privacy is an outcome; see Evans et al., 2017), an affordance perspective can
benefit privacy research given privacy being impacted by new media.
There is ample justification for a communicative affordance approach to studying human
communication concepts that have been impacted by new media (e.g., privacy). This approach
can highlight a relationship between individuals and technologies (Schrock, 2015), shift a
conceptualization away from a technological classification schema to broader understanding of
higher order behaviors (Faraj & Azad, 2013), and offer historical comparisons between differing
technological forms and seemingly novel technological features (a common issue when studying
emergent new media; Woodruff & Aoki, 2004). Thus, for the case of privacy, a communicative
affordance perspective would yield an understanding of how (and if) privacy is considered when
using new media.
Research involving social media affordances and perceptions of that media has given us
insight into why one might use a particular social media platform over another. However, a
common theme in this line of research is that privacy is an implicit variable (assuming it is
mentioned at all). Miller and colleagues (2019) found that a tension exists between Twitter users’
needs to build an audience, document information, and sending/receiving information. The
authors discussed how the platform has changed what people think is acceptable to speak up
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about regarding information freedom. In this case, privacy is an implicit/assumed variable in that
Twitter users want to build an audience (thus decreasing privacy) but also want to regulate the
kinds of information they share (thus maintaining their privacy). The authors all but describe this
as an example of the privacy paradox, where one wants to freely share information as a means of
building an audience of peers but also is expected to be concerned about the kinds of information
they share. Areepattamannil and Khine (2017) found that social media use correlates to
enjoyment, recreation, and self-concept. While this study lacked an explicit link to privacy, the
authors note that adolescent use of ICTs for recreation leads to greater frequency of use altogether
(which in turn could lead to other behavioral variables).
Scholars focusing on social media use have identified several communicative and
technological affordances that can be linked to privacy risks outlined by 6 (1998). Social media
use affordances include, but are not limited to, varied visibility (Siegert & Löwstedt, 2019) and/or
anonymity (Evans et al., 2017; Fox & Potocki, 2014), end-to-end encryption (Doffman, 2020a;
Hesse, 2020; Santos & Faure, 2018), and agency (Rathnayake & Winter, 2018; cf. Sundar [2008];
cf. Sundar & Limperos [2013]). While it can be assumed that privacy is related to these
affordances in that managing one’s online presence by using available technological affordances
can allow them to be private, both of these affordances contribute to the risk of avocational thrill
discussed by 6 (1998). When one chooses to spotlight themselves by amassing an audience and
making themselves publicly identifiable, they run the risk of having their privacy violated
because of how they willingly gave others the opportunity to violate their privacy. However, there
is little discussion of this, along with other privacy risks, within affordance literature; it is
imperative for a discussion on how specific affordances can be linked to privacy risks.
Visibility is one such technological affordance with roots in privacy management
behaviors and implicitly related to privacy risks. As noted by Evans and colleagues (2017),
visibility is an affordance that expands beyond one’s ability to display themself and is instead
concerned with how one can control the visibility of their information (i.e., data) to another user.
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Varied visibility on social media can involve one’s ability to selectively display their availability
(i.e., mediated presence) to be seen as online and offline (see Siegert & Löwstedt, 2019).
Visibility is implicitly related to privacy risks in that users could selectively share very little data
with others because they want a decreased online presence, but they could also do so because of
how visibility is integrated within that technology. For example, it is not required nor innovative
for one to geo-tag a photo on Instagram or Snapchat, but the feature is available for those who
choose to do so. Thus, it is imperative to gauge the relationship between the affordance of
visibility and one’s privacy concerns.
Persistence is another technological affordance with roots in privacy management
behaviors and implicitly related to privacy risks. This affordance has been linked to archivability
(Ellison et al., 2015) and durability (Treem & Leonardi, 2012) in the sense that an online
presence and/or set of information has the capabilities of retaining its presence for others to see as
well as its integrity for others to interpret. Like visibility, persistence is not an outcome nor
feature of using social media or new technologies, but instead varies across platforms and
mediums (Evans et al., 2017). For the case of privacy, it can be assumed that lesser persistence in
the form of a self-destructing message (i.e., a Snap on Snapchat) could be considered a more
private form of communication, but that persistence might not be the justification for why one
uses the feature/platform to begin with. Thus, it is imperative to gauge the relationship between
the affordance of persistence and one’s privacy concerns.
Although a common trend in social media affordance literature is a lack of explicit
privacy discourse, there are few exceptions. One such exception discusses a facet of privacy when
using the platform. Santos and Faure’s (2018) analysis of WhatsApp, a messaging service now
owned by Facebook, was highly descriptive in discussing the technological affordances of the
service. The authors compared how WhatsApp implemented and discussed specific technological
features (including those that preserved privacy; i.e., end-to-end encryption) in comparison to
WhatsApp’s competitors. The authors found that privacy-focused messaging platforms,
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WhatsApp included, self-advertise as being privacy-focused yet implement varying degrees of
privacy-keeping affordances. For the specific case of WhatsApp, the implementation of end-toend encryption maintains a level of privacy by preventing third parties from accessing messages
sent on the platform but fails to prevent WhatsApp users from leaking the messages themselves
(thus contributing to boundary turbulence). While this finding is valuable in that it highlights a
clear weakness in the supposed privacy-protecting nature of that platform, it all but describes if,
and how, users seek that platform for the purpose of privacy. In other words, how do certain
affordances factor into one deciding to use WhatsApp over another service, such as Telegram?
Another exception to the trend of privacy being absent from social media affordance
literature involves a reiteration of common trends found in privacy literature, specifically the
focus on interpersonal affordances adjacent to privacy. Siegert and Löwstedt’s (2019) study on
online boundary works sought to understand how social media use influenced the work-life
balance of government employees. While this study focused on online interpersonal affordances
(i.e., varying degrees of visibility in online spaces and having a persistent online presence), some
of their results included interpersonal privacy risks (e.g., fearing offline retaliation resulting from
an online faux pax). The shortcoming with this is twofold. First, it does not explicitly explain the
role privacy plays when one behaves online. Second, it does not explicitly discuss privacy
behaviors that are exclusive to online settings. Knowing these shortcomings are not exclusive to
affordance literature is an indication that there is room for a study focusing on mediated online
behaviors and privacy awareness.
A study seeking to understand privacy awareness and specific behaviors online should
look to prior studies on affordances involving social media use. We know that privacy is
considered when behaving online, but keeping in mind specific affordances unique to social
media might give us a greater understanding of which online affordances are closely related to
one practicing privacy. Technological affordances that specifically invade one’s own privacy
(e.g., geotagging a photograph on a social media) might give us greater insight as to how one
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considers privacy when using social media. Furthermore, the complacency associated with the
privacy paradox, as well as the apparent apathy and cynicism associated with taking the steps to
proactively preserve privacy might indicate a negative relationship between using the available
technological affordances to preserve privacy and privacy awareness (Hargittai & Marwick,
2016). Knowing the trend of privacy-adjacent concepts and the benefits of the communicative
affordance perspective, the present study seeks to answer the first research question and first
hypothesis of:
RQ1: What kinds of technological affordances are associated with greater awareness of
privacy?
H1: Awareness of mediated privacy is correlated negatively with awareness of privacy
affordances.

2.5

Privacy in Association with Contemporary Surveillance
Surveillance, or “the systematic monitoring of people or groups in order to regulate or

govern their behavior” (Monahan, 2011, p. 498), is a concept worth discussing in relation to
contemporary privacy. While privacy literature is not explicit with associating awareness of
surveillance and the tangible effects of being watched, much of surveillance literature links to
privacy issues. Modern technological advances and contemporary risks have caused us to assume
that all of our verbal and nonverbal behaviors are being monitored in airports (for national
security purposes; Adey, 2006) and in the workplace (Kizza & Ssanyu, 2005). We know that our
Internet histories as well as the devices we own are subject to being used by our government for
monitoring us and those around us (see Caluya, 2010). There is also a risk of us showing up on
someone else’s social media feed or an amateur recording (Koskela, 2004, 2009). It is very easy
to assume that privacy is dead because of the magnitude of surveillance occurring in the status
quo (Lyon, 2010). However, the concerns of being surveilled (be it from an intentional
government actor or on social media) are similar to the privacy risks outlined by 6 (1998); the
slow killers and avocational thrills can be associated with surveillance issues. There could be
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long-term effects of being monitored (i.e., an effect of a slow killer) as well as shown on someone
else’s social media feed (i.e., a side effect of our willingness to use social media via an
avocational thrill).
Surveillance’s embeddedness within our culture seems to mirror the problem of the
privacy paradox. Monahan (2011) argues that a reflexive approach for understanding this
embeddedness is necessary for a cohesive understanding of contemporary surveillance. While the
author does not make explicit recommendations for how this reflexivity can be operationalized
(see also boyd, 2012), one such way of enacting that reflexivity can be through understanding
how awareness of surveillance is related to awareness of privacy, if at all.
Research on surveillance awareness has been generally descriptive for understanding how
our behaviors change once we learn we are being watched. Workplaces who enact “performance
monitoring” ICTs (e.g., web filters) to deter workplace loafing cause resentment among
employees (Lim, 2002) as well as create a workplace atmosphere of fear and mistrust (Kizza &
Ssanyu, 2005; Mujtaba, 2003). In instances where employees are already aware of pre-existing
acts of surveillance, the introduction of new measures (i.e., an organization decides to implement
a new monitoring technology) causes workers to harbor negative feelings toward their employers
(Martin et al., 2016; Sarpong & Rees, 2014). Thus, knowing that someone is now watching with
some form of repercussions changes one’s behavior.
There is a key implication of these findings in relation to privacy literature. Our concerns
about surveillance might be present, yet are amplified when we are made aware of a new instance
of surveillance and/or our expectations regarding surveillance are violated. These concerns
function like privacy concerns in that individuals are knowledgeable yet apathetic about their
privacy unless or until something tangible happens to them (see Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). If
this is the case, then a relationship might exist between awareness of surveillance and privacy.
Thus, the study’s second hypothesis is:

20

H2: Awareness of mediated privacy is correlated positively with awareness of
surveillance.

2.6

Privacy in Association with Misled Media Usage and Moot Modalities
Before one can gain access to a social media platform (or a new media technology), they

must agree to a privacy policy. A frequent cause of privacy mismanagement exists in the form of
skimming through that privacy policy before using a new application. In the present day, privacy
policies have been constructed around contemporary privacy legislation, such as the European
Union’s GDPR (GDPR, 2016) and California’s California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA; Sirota,
2019), as a means of protecting the end user from privacy risks. Whether or not these policies
protect users’ privacy is outside of the scope of this study, but understanding how one
(ir)responsibly interacts with a privacy policy might lend insight into addressing the privacy
paradox, specifically in relation to the affordances offered by a privacy policy.
The easiest explanation for users’ lax behavior is that a user does not have the time nor
interest in reading through a convoluted document because of how consent processes have
become routinized (Ploug & Holm, 2013). Another easy explanation for this can exist in the form
of policies being constructed without requiring users to actually read the policy and instead skip
ahead to the “I Agree” button (which is not compliant with the GDPR [GDPR, 2016]). Rossi and
Palmirani (2017) argue that because most privacy policies and terms of service (ToS) agreements
are dense, unintuitive, and lack plain language, alternative formats of displaying these policies
(e.g., images, quizzes) might assist in informing users of what users are giving up (i.e., their
privacy) in exchange for access to the application. Although regulations such as the GDPR have
taken steps at standardizing how privacy policies are displayed to end users (see Katulić &
Katulić, 2018), users still skip past the text and seek out the “I agree” checkbox. While readable
and simplified privacy policies might not be standard and available in the status quo, it would
seem likely that users would react differently to seeing alternative elements (e.g., pictures) in a
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privacy policy compared to a problematic policy oft-found in our daily lives. In short, modality
matters. A study involving privacy policies displayed in different modalities can yield a greater
understanding into how one gives away their privacy in order to access a new technology. While
it can be assumed from the literature that individuals might seek out the “I agree” button on a
page to skip past a gigantic privacy policy, the literature lacks explanations regarding how one
interacts with a policy that has been condensed and/or reformatted for easier understanding. The
ways in which one interacts with a privacy policy in a(n) (ir)responsible fashion can be further
explained from the lens of mass communication theories, specifically those that pertain to media
use.
The paradoxes of personalization and privacy can be explained using the lens of media
use theories, such as the diffusion of innovation (DoI) and the MAIN model. Both theories are
capable of predicting and describing the extent to which one adopts, uses, and continues to use a
new technology. With regard to the paradoxes of privacy and personalization, these theories also
offer insight into the extent one gives away their privacy in exchange for access to a new
technology.
Rogers’ (1962) diffusion of innovation (DoI) has been used in communication research to
predict and describe how users apply new technologies (i.e., innovations) to their lives over time.
The theory argues that the success of those new technologies depends on how they are
introduced, how users discuss those technologies, how those discussions diffuse through other
networks, and how quickly those technologies and resultant discussions diffuse through other
networks. DoI tends to focus on specific forms of communication and information found on new
media (e.g., Twitter; English, 2016; Schwartz & Grimm, 2017). Although privacy might not be
found in the communication literature as an outcome variable related to a new technology’s
diffusion through society, legal studies literature argues that privacy would prohibit the diffusion
of new innovations. Bernstein (2006) considers privacy risks a threat to the diffusion of new
technologies regardless of the threat’s likelihood. If this was the case in the present day, then
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invasive technologies would not be adopted at their current rapid rate. However, the inverse is
occurring. Knowing that technologies are becoming increasingly invasive, DoI might not be fit
for predicting the success of those technologies. Instead, it can be used as a reference for
predicting how a user could adopt a technology and the effects of doing so.
Sundar’s (2008) MAIN model determines how users perceive credibility from new
media. Rather than focusing on the content of the medium, MAIN focuses on technological cues
that are tied to judgements, be it cues of modality, agency, interactivity, and/or navigability.
Although this theoretical foundation has not explicitly been used with privacy research, specific
tenets (i.e., affordances) of the model have been used to determine how one might use a new form
of invasive technology, namely agency and modality.
The affordances of agency and modality are associated with how one decides to use a
new technology, specifically one that infringes upon one’s online privacy. Sundar and Marathe
(2010) found that privacy was a key predictor of user attitudes toward personalization and
customization of news feeds in that giving users a greater sense of agency caused average users to
respond favorably to tailored content (thus confirming the personalization paradox), whereas
power users (i.e., those with high technological expertise) need assurances regarding their control
of their privacy (thus confirming the privacy paradox). Cho and colleagues (2020) note a similar
finding in their study on smart speakers (e.g., Amazon Alexa-powered devices); users who were
the most privacy-conscious were most likely to delete their voice recordings (i.e., take the steps to
preserve their privacy) yet reported a decreased user experience when presented with the
opportunity to customize their privacy using the interface (similar to the cynicism noted by
Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; thus confirming the privacy paradox). In sum, when given the option
to do something about protecting one’s own privacy when using a new technology, even the most
technologically savvy and privacy-conscious individual begrudgingly took the step to protect
themselves.
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DoI and the MAIN model support the privacy and personalization paradoxes. With
regard to DoI, widespread technological adoption will occur despite a technology’s problematic
nature in cases where that technology meets a need (i.e., innovates a process) of a significant
number of individuals. If a new technology offers an individual a novel way of meeting a
communication need in exchange for a massive amount of user information, it can be assumed
that it is only a matter of time before others will follow suit and give up their information in the
name of customization. With regard to MAIN (or specific affordances therein), widespread
technological adoption can occur due to a variety of heuristics (e.g., bandwagon, helper, bellsand-whistles, and novelty; see Sundar, 2008). If an invasive technology contains enough novelty,
or enough individuals use it to the point of others being influenced to do so, too, it can be
assumed that both the average user and power users will give away their information in exchange
for access to that new technology (although power users might begrudgingly or concernedly do
so). Because of the inevitable adoption of invasive technologies, it is worth moving past
questioning how we can preserve one’s privacy post-hoc but instead gauge the extent one would
give away their privacy in exchange for technological access.
The present study takes these considerations in mind in that there might be differences in
one using a privacy policy when it is presented in a myriad of fashions. Thus, the present study
seeks to manipulate several aspects of the privacy policy consideration process for a greater
understanding into the environment in which one gives their privacy away. Manipulating the
privacy policy’s structure (i.e., a full policy, a summarized policy, and a policy containing
imagery) might yield an understanding into differences between how one consents to have their
privacy given away. Manipulating the content of a privacy policy (i.e., a policy about a health
technology and a policy about a clothing application) might yield a clarification regarding how
one might want to give their privacy away in exchange for a personalized experience.
New technologies and contemporary social issues seemingly unrelated to privacy are
bound to involve privacy as they become more feature-filled (or data-driven) and interwoven
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between multiple public spheres. Universities across the US are creating and implementing
smartphone applications to track students’ behaviors in the classroom for the purpose of academic
honesty and class attendance (e.g., SpotterEDU; Harwell, 2019; Schwarz, 2020). The novel
Coronavirus (i.e., COVID-19) has impacted multiple industries and brought together the fields of
health, new technology, and law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 worldwide through the
implementation of contact-tracing applications (i.e., applications that track one’s GPS location
and notify them in the instance when they were in close contact with an individual who has tested
positive for COVID-19; Byford, 2020). Although implementing these apps has proved difficult
for technological, fiscal, and governmental reasons (Browne, 2020), misinformation campaigns
on social media highlighted a significant privacy concern among social media users. That is,
people are concerned (some outright unwilling) to use these applications because of how they
potentially invade one’s privacy through permanently utilizing the GPS on one’s smartphone
(Dev, 2020; Feibus, 2020). While this concern might be linked to conspiracy theories regarding
new technologies, it highlights how a new technology created to aid public health is pushed into a
territory involving privacy concerns.
Although contact tracing has been employed (with varying degrees of success) prior to
2020 to address outbreaks worldwide (Bernard et al., 2018), the sudden concern regarding using
contact tracing applications and awareness of individual privacy is important for two reasons.
First, it supports the notion that, while we might be under constant surveillance under the status
quo, we might not concern ourselves with surveillance until a new method of surveillance is
suddenly and visibly introduced (Martin et al., 2016; Sarpong & Rees, 2014). Second, and most
importantly, it contradicts the notion of how users adopting a cutting edge technology might
willingly give up their privacy in order to access an affordance of that new technology, such as a
new health technology aiming to benefit public health (Cheung et al., 2016). There seems to be an
extent to which one knowingly and willingly gives up their privacy. Thus, the study seeks to
answer the final research question of:
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RQ2: How does the modality of a privacy policy factor into individuals making privacy
decisions?
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS
3.1

Overview
The purpose of this study was to better understand the extent to which, and affordances

related to individuals perceiving their privacy when presented with privacy policies, as well as
understand the relationship between individuals’ reported privacy beliefs and their awareness of
online privacy. To answer the study’s research questions and hypotheses, the present study
employed a 2 (health or personalization) x 3 (full, partial, or picture policy) between-subjects
design experiment with a control condition (no treatment). The study involved deception in that
students were asked to evaluate a “new app” for smartphones and encouraging them to read
through a type of privacy policy/description.

3.2

Participants
The study’s participants were obtained via convenience sampling from a population of

undergraduate students at a large southern university. After receiving IRB approval, participants
were recruited using the university’s SONA system (i.e., an online participant recruitment system
that offers college credit in college communication courses). To be eligible for the study,
participants had to be at least 18-years of age. This population was chosen because of the
convenience offered by recruiting available participants as well as the appropriateness of having
young adults participate in a study on topics that might concern them (e.g., privacy during a
pandemic period). To detect a moderate effect size at the 0.8 level, an a priori power analysis was
conducted using G*Power 3.1 and determined that a minimum of 222 participants was needed for
the present study’s 7 total conditions (i.e., ~30 participants per condition). Because the study
employed deception, the IRB required the use of a debriefing and opt-out system at the end of the
survey that informed participants of the true nature of the study as well as an opportunity to
withdraw without penalty. To account for attrition in the form of participations choosing to opt
out, at least 250 participants were initially requested.

When data collection had concluded, 284 participants had taken the survey. Several
procedures were used to assure sample quality: (1) excessive speed of response, (2) explicit
requests to opt out of the study, and (3) gross incompletion. There were 5 participants omitted for
taking less than one minute to complete the survey. The average participant took 9.23 minutes to
complete the survey. There were 17 participants who were omitted for explicitly requesting to opt
out. There were 6 additional participants who were removed for leaving at least 15 consecutive
items blank. Thus, the final sample contained 256 total participants (N = 256).
In terms of university class standing, the sample featured diverse representation across all
cohort years with the exception of graduate/professional students. The sample was made up of a
population that consisted of 34.8% (n = 89) first year students, 7.0% (n = 18) sophomores, 35.9%
(n = 92) juniors, 21.9% (n = 56) seniors, and one (0.9%) graduate/professional student. In terms
of gender, participants were mainly female. The sample was made up of 34.0% (n = 87) males,
65.6% (n = 168) females, and one (0.4%) non-binary/third gendered individual. Participant ages
ranged from 18 to 53, with an average age of 20.65 years old (SD = 4.02) and median age of 20
years old. Nine participants declined to report their age. Participants were given the opportunity
to report their ethnicity or ethnicities, if applicable. The sample was overwhelmingly
white/Caucasian. In terms of ethnicity, 80.1% (n = 205) identified as white/Caucasian, 11.7% (n
= 30) identified as black/African American, 7.4% (n = 19%) identified as Asian/Pacific Islander,
2.0% (n = 5) identified as Latino/Hispanic, 1.2% (n = 3) identified as American Indian/Alaskan
Native, and one individual (0.4%) wrote in their ethnicity. In terms of sexuality, the sample was
comprised of almost all heterosexuals. In terms of sexuality, 94.1% (n = 241) identified as
heterosexual (straight), 0.4% (n = 1) identified as gay, 0.4% (n = 1) identified as lesbian, 3.1% (n
= 8) identified as bisexual, 0.8% (n = 2) identified as asexual, and 1.2% (n = 3) identified as
“Other” and wrote in their sexuality as an option not listed on the survey. In terms of political
affiliation, respondents were primarily liberal or conservative, with 28.1% (n = 72) identifying as
liberal, 33.6% (n = 86) identifying as conservative, 16.8% (n = 43) identifying as independent,
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19.1% identifying as unsure, and 2.3% (n = 6) identifying as another affiliation unlisted on the
survey.
Participants were given the opportunity to report their smartphone usage and social media
usage. In terms of the number of apps that participants had installed on their smartphones, 250
participants reported a median number of 33 (M = 44.63, SD = 31.15) and 6 participants declined
to answer. In terms of the type of smartphone participants used, 94.9% (n = 243) owned iPhones
and 5.1% (n = 13) owned Android devices. With regard to social media usage, most participants
reported to be frequently checking their social media each day. In terms of frequency of usage,
35% (n = 92) reported to check their social media every hour, 44.1% (n = 113) reported to check
multiple times a day, 12.1% (n = 31) reported to check a few times during the day, 4.7% (n = 12)
reported to check at least once a day, 2.0% (n = 5) reported to check a few times a week, 0.8% (n
= 2) reported to check less than a few times a month, and 0.4% (n = 1) declined to answer. The
median number of hours per week participants used social media was 12 hours (M = 17.54, SD =
19.80).
Participants were given an opportunity to list which social media applications, if any,
they used on a regular basis. Participants were most likely to use Snapchat and/or Instagram. In
terms of which social media applications participants used, 90.2% (n = 231) reported to use
Instagram, 90.2% (n = 231) reported to use Snapchat, 68.8% (n = 176) reported to use TikTok,
67.6% (n = 173) reported to use Facebook, 59.4% (n = 152) reported to use Twitter, 41.0% (n =
105) reported to use LinkedIn, 14.5% (n = 37) reported to use Reddit, 4.7% (n = 12) reported to
use tumblr., and 5.5% (n = 14) reported to use a social media platform that was not listed on the
survey.
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3.3

Procedures
3.3.1

Stimuli Design and Categorization

The present study contained six different experimental conditions that varied in terms of
the manipulations mentioned above and explained in detail below. The control condition was
shown a message saying that the participant was not invited to review an application at this time
but would still ask participants to complete the survey. The remainder of the manipulated
conditions are broken down by context and modality.
This study required the use of stimuli modeled after smartphone notifications, application
(i.e., “app”) store descriptions, and privacy policies that could be seen in the present day and
interpreted by members of the general population, more specifically: currently enrolled
University students. Considering the recommendations of privacy policy researchers (e.g., Rossi
& Palmirani, 2017), two additional privacy policies that corresponded to the conditions intended
for this study (i.e., Partial Policy and Picture Policy) were created featuring condensed and
easier-to-understand language as well as images.
Participants were assigned to one of seven conditions (six treatment conditions, one
control condition), with the treatment conditions varying by health and personalization and
privacy policy modality. The Surveillance of Health condition showed participants a description
of a fake COVID-tracing application that is being developed (i.e., UKCovidWatch) as well as a
mockup of what a “notification” would look like on an iPhone. The app’s description contained a
novel COVID-19-tracing application, how it tracked students, and how it worked. This condition
was created because of the exigence of COVID-19 as well as the misinformation and public
concern related to contact tracing applications (Browne, 2020; Feibus, 2020). This context was
also chosen because of its timeliness and exigence related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Personalization condition showed participants a description of a fake application (i.e.,
DropWatch) that notifies users of important sales of products that they may desire (e.g.,
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collectible shoes). This condition showed participants a new smartphone application that gives
users the opportunity to hand over their personal data (i.e., interests) in exchange for a
personalized user experience. This condition was created with the personalization paradox in
mind (see Aguirre et al., 2015) as well as prior new media research based on customizing
platforms that require information (Sundar et al., 2013; Sundar & Marathe, 2010). Furthermore,
an iPhone notification mockup was chosen because of the device’s popularity as well as its
similarities with other lockscreen notifications.
The other factor, modality, was varied in the following ways: Full Policy, Partial Policy,
and Picture Policy. The key difference between these conditions is that the same privacy policy
was displayed, albeit with slight differences.
The Full Policy condition simply showed participants a large and cumbersome privacy
policy (modeled after TikTok’s policy) as well as a question at the bottom of the policy asking if
they consented to use the application. This modality of privacy policy was selected because of its
consistency with other problematic policies that exist in the status quo that are controversially
dense, wordy, and lack a means of gauging informed consent (Rossi & Palmirani, 2017). For
most (if not all) users in the condition, it would be safe to assume that they had encountered a
nearly identical policy from another social media platform.
The Partial Policy condition showed participants a summary of a large privacy policy
that is broken down into bullets, as well as a button at the bottom of the policy asking if they
consent to use the application and/or a button asking if the participant would like to read the full
policy. This modality of privacy policy was selected because of its consistency with policies that
are currently compliant with the GDPR (but still problematic).
The Picture Policy condition was identical to the Partial Policy condition but also
featured several images that accompanied the summaries. This modality was selected because of
its consistency with the recommendations of prior research involving the implementation of
imagery with policies to potentially increase informed consent (see Rossi & Palmirani, 2017).
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3.3.2

Study Procedure Overview

Upon beginning the survey, the Qualtrics system randomly assigned participants to one
of seven conditions: Surveillance of Health Full Policy, Surveillance of Health Partial Policy,
Surveillance of Health Picture Policy, Personalization Full Policy, Personalization Partial
Policy, Personalization Picture Policy, or Control. Participants were first asked about their social
media use (e.g., which social media platforms they use, how they use social media) and
demographics (e.g., age, gender, sexuality, class standing). Then, participants were presented
with a brief summary of an invasive privacy application (depending on condition). The
participants in the Full Policy condition were exposed to a gigantic privacy policy modeled after
one found on social media (e.g., TikTok). The Partial Policy condition participants were exposed
to a condensed privacy policy using plain language, short summaries, pages to click through, and
a “Click here for more information” button that redirected them to the full privacy policy. The
participants in the Picture Policy condition were exposed to a condensed privacy policy, too, but
featured images alongside the plain language. Participants in the Control condition were not be
shown an application nor privacy policy at all and immediately proceeded with the rest of the
survey that did not involve feedback on the new application.
Participants who were shown an application were asked to give “feedback” on the
application using four usability questions. Then, participants were shown 26 items related to their
knowledge and awareness of their online privacy. Finally, participants were shown seven items
gauging their knowledge and awareness of online surveillance. After the study, participants were
debriefed on how the study is not actually about a new smartphone app, but instead a study on
privacy awareness. In compliance with the IRB’s requests, participants had the opportunity to
withdraw from the study if they choose. After consenting to share their data from this study after
being debriefed on the deception, the participants were thanked for their time.
As noted, the Qualtrics system randomly assigned participants to one of seven
experimental conditions, albeit at two different stages of the survey. The first random assignment
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took place after the participants provided demographic feedback, in which participants were
evenly placed into the Health (n = 83), Personalization (n = 84), and Control (n = 89) conditions.
Participants in the Health and Personalization conditions were shown different versions of the
same application, and then randomly and evenly assigned to the Full Policy (n = 54), Partial
Policy (n = 58), and Picture Policy (n = 55).
Thus, the resultant six conditions were Health Full Policy (n = 27), Health Partial Policy
(n = 28), Health Picture Policy (n = 28), Personalization Full Policy (n = 27), Personalization
Partial Policy (n = 30), Personalization Picture Policy (n = 27), and Control (i.e., No Policy; n =
89). Oversampling of the control condition did not occur in that an equal number of participants
were placed in the beginning when the initial randomization assigned participants to the control
or two treatment conditions. The secondary random yet even distribution that occurred only
involved the treatment subconditions and did not require a second control group.

3.4

Measurement
Several items on this study’s survey were initially adapted from pre-existing literature on

surveillance, privacy affordances, and privacy awareness. Several items from these scales were
slightly reworded for clarity for the study’s population. Additional scales were created to measure
the knowledge of affordance variables. The present study has a measured independent variable
(i.e., awareness of mediated privacy), manipulated independent variables (i.e., the experimental
conditions), and three dependent variables (i.e., awareness of surveillance, awareness of privacy
affordances, and usability). Unless otherwise noted, all items were presented and measured using
a 7-point Likert-style of agreement (i.e., strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neither
disagree nor agree, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree).
Mean responses from each statement in the survey measures used in this study were
calculated. The items for each dependent and independent measure were used to create scales to
test the study’s hypotheses and answer the study’s research questions. Prior to running analysis,
the descriptive statistics for all dependent variables were examined for normality (see Table 3.1).
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Means and standard deviations appeared acceptable. For all but two variables, minimum
and maximum variables indicated that participants had a variety of perceptions of their online
privacy and privacy-adjacent concepts in this study. IBM SPSS 27 was used to check multiple
criteria to determine whether the data were suitable for the analysis. The skewness values for all
variables were all in the acceptable range of between -1 and 1. The data were checked for outliers
using Mahalanobis’ distance and were deemed acceptable for univariate analyses.

3.4.1

Measured IV: Awareness of Mediated Privacy

The present study’s measured independent variable, awareness of mediated privacy,
involved seven items measuring privacy concerns (e.g., It bothers me when apps ask me to
provide personal information) and five items measuring privacy awareness (e.g., It is okay for my
account provider [such a Facebook] to share my profile information with some websites.) These
were adapted from exigent subscales that have demonstrated significant reliability and used in
prior affordance and privacy research (e.g., Adhafferi et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2020; Dinev & Hart,
2005; Koohang, 2017; Krasnova, 2017). These items were intended to measure participants’
awareness of their online privacy as it pertained to social media. Although these studies have used
multiple subscales to measure awareness and concern of privacy, an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) and scale analysis was run to determine the validity of the Awareness of Mediated Privacy
scale. The resultant EFA with varimax rotation indicated a unidimensional factor structure
involving 8 (items of the original 12) loading onto a single component; the resultant scale
analysis of these 8 items indicated a strong reliability such that a greater value indicated a greater
perception (i.e., awareness and concern) of mediated privacy (Cronbach’s α = .93, M = 5.29, SD
= 1.19).

3.4.2

Measured DV: Awareness of Affordances

The present study’s first dependent variable, awareness of affordances, was measured
using a novel measure (containing three subscales) created for this study. This measure contained
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four items that measured knowledge of Visibility (e.g., I know how to adjust the visibility of my
social media profiles.), six items that measured knowledge of Persistence (e.g., I have taken
screenshots of my friends’ social media posts), and four items that measured knowledge of
Encryption Affordances (e.g., I have used apps that feature end-to-end encryption). Items were
based on examples of these affordances as described in the literature (e.g., Evans et al., 2017;
Miller et al., 2019; Santos & Faure, 2018; Siegert & Löwstedt, 2019). These items were created,
rather than adapted from pre-existing scales, because of how these affordances tended to evolve
in tandem (often quickly) with their associated technologies. An exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) and individual scale analyses were run to determine the validity of the Awareness of
Affordances subscales. The resultant EFA with varimax rotation indicated a three-factor structure
involving 11 of the 14 items. The resultant scale analyses indicated strong reliability for the
Persistence (n = 3, Cronbach’s α = .64, M = 5.17, SD = 1.18), Visibility (n = 4, Cronbach’s α =
.67, M = 5.70, SD = .89), and Encryption Affordances (n = 4, Cronbach’s α = .70, M = 4.04, SD
=.94) subscales, such that larger values indicate a greater awareness of the aforementioned
affordances.

3.4.3

Measured DV: Awareness of Surveillance

The present study’s second dependent variable, awareness of surveillance, was measured
using seven items adapted from the surveillance scale in Xu et al.’s (2012) information privacy
scale (e.g., I am aware that tagging myself at a location can make my information public). This
specific subscale was chosen because of its reliability in prior research as well as its containing
contemporary items of mediated surveillance. Although the scale itself initially created three
items, additional novel items were created to enhance the potential robustness for use in this
study. The responses to the six items were summed and averaged to create a scale, which was
found to be reliable such that a greater value indicated a greater awareness of surveillance
(Cronbach’s α = .79, M = 5.63, SD = .91).
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3.4.4

Measured DV: Usability

Usability was measured after users read through the privacy policies. These four items
were created specifically for the study and were used to determine the likelihood of users opting
into using the imaginary application. These items asked 1.) if the tool is “effective” at achieving
the intended effects (e.g., a typical usability study’s survey items), 2.) if the application met
participants’ needs, and 3.) the likelihood of them using it. The usability items concluded with a
box for students to write in qualitative feedback. The responses to the four items were summed
and averaged to create a scale, which was found to be reliable such that a greater value indicated
greater usability (Cronbach’s α = .85, M = 4.11, SD = 1.38). Of the 167 participants who were
initially assigned to one of the health and personalization sub-conditions, 39 participants provided
qualitative feedback. Of those 39, 31 provided feedback beyond one-word responses (e.g., “N/A,”
“none,” “no”).
Usability was also measured by calculating the frequency at which participants consented
or not consented to using the application. If participants were placed in the Partial or Picture
conditions, they were presented with the option to consent, not consent, or read a version of the
full privacy policy. If they chose to read the full privacy policy, they were presented with another
consent item. The frequencies of those who consented, not consented, and opted to read more can
be found on Table 3.2.
Of the 167 participants who were presented with a privacy policy, 59.3% (n = 99)
consented, 28.6% (n = 47) did not consent, and 12.6% (n = 21) opted to read more (involving
6.0% [n = 10] consenting after reading more and 6.6% [n = 11] not consenting after reading
more). Taking policy modality into account, 17.6% (n = 33) consented after reading the full
privacy policy, 18.1% (n = 34) consented after reading the partial policy, and 17.0% (n = 32)
consented after reading the policy containing pictures. Taking into account the application’s
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context (i.e., health or personalization), there were more participants who consented to use the
application than not consenting. However, in the picture x health condition, more participants did
not consent than those who did consent, whereas those in the picture x personalization condition
consented to a far greater extent than those who did not consent. Finally, of the few individuals
who opted into reading the full privacy policy, all participants in the picture x health condition
did not consent to use the application, whereas all participants in the picture x personalization
consented to use the application.

3.4.5

Data Analysis Strategy

In order to answer the aforementioned research questions and hypotheses, the
following tests and procedures were outlined and approved. Prior to analysis, scale and
exploratory factor analyses needed to be conducted for the novel measures that were
created specifically for this study (i.e., Awareness of Affordances). These measures are to
be considered reliable if their KMO measures are above the .600 criteria and have a
Cronbach’s α equal to or greater than 0.7.
The study’s hypotheses will be tested by running several correlations between the
study’s single measured IV (i.e., Awareness of Mediated Privacy) and two DVs (i.e.,
Awareness of Surveillance, Awareness of Affordances). This will be done because all
variables are continuous variables and are not exclusive to the experimental conditions
implemented in this study. RQ1 seeks to understand which kinds of affordances are most
associated with awareness of privacy. This will be determined using correlations, too.
The affordance submeasure (i.e., Visibility, Persistence, and Encryption) with the greatest
correlation to awareness of privacy will answer the research question.
The second research question can be answered by running a 2x3 factorial ANOVA to
determine differences between the contextual conditions (i.e., Health and Personalization) as well
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as the modality conditions (i.e., Full Policy, Partial Policy, and Picture Policy). This test will be
run because the study will have six manipulated conditions, as well as a control. Furthermore,
Usability is a continuous measure that seeks to understand how likely one might use a theoretical
application depending on its context as well as the modality of its privacy policy. An ANOVA
will yield a better understanding of likelihood of future use on a per-group basis.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Measured Variable
M
SD

MIN

MAX

Skew

Kurt.

α

Awareness of Mediated
Privacy

5.29

1.19

1.00

7.00

-.77

.63

.93

Awareness of Surveillance

5.63

.91

2.67

7.00

-.57

.25

.79

Awareness of Persistence

5.20

1.18

1.33

7.00

-.62

-.10

.64

Awareness of Encryption

4.04

.94

1.75

7.00

.68

.94

.70

Awareness of Visibility

5.70

.89

3.00

7.00

-.51

-.18

.67

Usability

4.11

1.38

1.00

7.00

.08

-.29

.85

Table 3.2
Frequencies of Consent
Condition

Full Policy

Partial Policy

Picture Policy

Health

Personalization

Health

Personalization

Health

Personalization

Consent

12

21

16

18

11

21

No Consent

6

15

7

4

13

2

5

8

4

4

Yes

2

4

0

4

No

3

4

4

0

More
Information
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
The present study posed two hypotheses and two research questions the relationship between
privacy awareness and related privacy variables (e.g., surveillance), the relationship between
privacy awareness and awareness of technological affordances related to privacy, and how
individuals react to privacy policies of different modalities.

4.1

H1, RQ1, H2
The present study’s first hypothesis (H1) posited that awareness of mediated privacy

correlated negatively with awareness of privacy affordances. The study’s first research question
(RQ1) sought to understand what kinds of technological affordances were associated with greater
awareness of privacy. Several two-tailed Pearson’s correlations were conducted between the
independent variable of awareness of mediated privacy and dependent variables involving
awareness of persistence, visibility, and encryption. With regard to awareness of mediated
privacy and awareness of persistence, it was found that no significant relationship existed (rpers =
.05 [-.09, .18], p = .47). With regard to awareness of mediated privacy and awareness of
visibility, it was found that a weak, positive, and significant correlation existed (rvis = .29 [.16,
.41], p < .001). With regard to awareness of mediated privacy and awareness of encryption, it was
found that a weak, positive, and significant relationship existed (renc = .35 [.24, .47], p < .001).
Although H1 is not supported, the technological affordances associated with greater awareness of
privacy (that demonstrated significant relationships) were visibility and encryption, thus
answering RQ1.
The study’s second hypothesis (H2) posited that awareness of mediated privacy
correlated positively with awareness of surveillance. A two-tailed Pearson’s correlation was
conducted between the independent variable of awareness of mediated privacy and dependent
variable of awareness of surveillance. The resultant correlation found that a positive and
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significant relationship existed between awareness of mediated privacy and awareness of
surveillance (rsurv = .54 [.43, .64], p < .001). Thus, H2 is supported.

4.2

RQ2
The second research question sought to understand the relationship between the modality

of a privacy policy and the variables of awareness of surveillance, intentions to use an invasive
application, and awareness of privacy. This research question was answered in the following
fashions.
First, a 2x3 factorial ANOVA was conducted between the six experimental conditions
and the usability subscale. It was found that there was no significant main effect between being
shown a different type of application, modality of privacy policy, and intention to use an invasive
application, F(5, 161) = .514, p = .77, ηρ2 = .02. Individual differences between groups were
found to lack significance, as well.
Second, a 2x3x1 factorial ANOVA was conducted between the six experimental
conditions, the control condition, and the privacy awareness subscale. It was found that there was
no significant main effect between the type of privacy policy displayed, type of application
displayed, and awareness of mediated privacy, F(6, 249) = 1.14, p = .34, ηρ2 = .03. However,
there were significant differences indicated in the post hoc tests. Respondents indicated greater
awareness of privacy when they were in the control condition (M = 5.38, SE = .13, p < .05) than
when they were in the personalization picture policy condition (M = 4.80, SE = .23, p < .05).
Respondents also indicated greater awareness of privacy when they were in the health picture
policy condition (M = 5.56. SE = .22, p < .05) than when they were in the personalization picture
policy condition (M = 4.80, SE = .23, p < .05). There were no other significant differences
between any of the conditions in the post hoc tests. Even though the lack of a significant main
effect indicates no systematic variability in the outcome, the post hocs indicate specific
differences associated with the condition assigned and dependent variable.
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Third, a 2x3x1 factorial ANOVA was conducted between the six experimental
conditions, the control condition, and the surveillance scale. It was found that there was no
significant main effect between the type of privacy policy displayed, type of application
displayed, and awareness of surveillance, F(6, 249) = .93, p = .45, ηρ2 = .02. Individual
differences between groups were found to lack significance, as well.

4.3

Additional Analyses: Qualitative Content Analysis
Since there were not many experimental main effects found between the modality of a

privacy policy shown to participants and their self-reported intentions to use an application,
awareness of privacy, and awareness of surveillance, the qualitative feedback was analyzed in
order to gain a better understanding of how individuals reacted to these privacy policies. Given
that individuals wrote up short statements that reflected more details (in some cases) than their
self-reported feedback, it was imperative to run a content analysis to look for trends within the
qualitative responses (White & Marsh, 2006).
Qualitative data were analyzed in accordance with mixed method procedures (White &
Marsh, 2006) that involve quantitative and qualitative data. For the purpose of this study, the
quantitative usability data was a message’s tonal valence and qualitative usability data was a
message’s thematic response. A grounded approach was employed to explore and categorize
themes surrounding how participants felt about the invasive application and/or privacy policy
they were shown. The process resulted in 6 identified themes. The codebook is provided in Table
4.1, which contains an overview of the response themes with an example from the data. These
data were also used to answer RQ2.
The 31 qualitative responses were initially coded for tonal valence (i.e., positive,
negative, neutral tone) and then by thematic responses. A response with positive tone indicated
that the participant supported the application, demonstrated interest in the application, and/or felt
the need to share their desire to use the application if it were available. A response with negative
tone indicated that the participant did not support the application, demonstrated concern with the
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application or its features, and/or felt the need to share their distaste with the applications
existence. A response with neutral polarity was one that was either vague and/or lacked a clear
opinion of the application. Once these comments were categorized by tonal polarity, their
frequencies were tallied. The resultant frequencies are as follows: Of the 31 qualitative responses,
most were negative (35.4%; n = 11) or neutral (38.7%; n = 12), with 25.8% (n = 8) being
positive.
A content analysis on the 31 qualitative usability responses was conducted. Tonal
responses were analyzed to explore participants’ reactions to the application and privacy policy.
Tonal responses were relatively evenly distributed among being negative (n = 11; 35%), neutral
(n = 12; 39%), and positive (n = 8; 26%). This indicates that participants’ reactions were
relatively mixed. The thematic content analysis yielded six themes encompassing the most
frequent kinds of responses participants reported involving the applications and/or privacy policy.
The most frequent response from the participants was that involving data concerns (n = 11, 35%),
with the rest being relatively evenly distributed among the five other themes (i.e., additional
information requests [n = 2; 6.5%], policy/notification language request [n = 5; 16.1%], simple
opinion/intention [n = 5; 16.1%], technological feature concerns [n = 4; 12.9%] and utilitarian
self-reflection [n = 4; 12.9%]). Eight of the participants who left comments regarding data
concerns were shown the health application, five of which were shown the picture policy. This
indicates that, when presented with a simplified privacy policy (with pictures) for a health-related
application, there are some initial concerns regarding data collection.
The frequencies of consent across conditions support these findings, as well. While over
half of those shown a privacy policy consented to use the application (without taking into account
the 10 participants who consented after being shown the full policy), there were three instances
where there were more participants who did not consent rather than consent, all of which
involved the health application. In the partial health policy condition, over half of those who
opted into reading the full privacy policy did not consent to use the application. In the picture
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health condition, there were slightly more individuals who did not consent to use the application
than those who consented. Of the few who opted to reading the full policy in this condition (i.e.,
health picture), none of them consented to use the application. This indicates a unique trend
among those presented with a condensed policy and/or policy containing pictures for a health
application: Participants seem to be concerned enough about the health application to not consent
and opt out of the opportunity to use that application.

4.4

Synopsis
The present study found several key results. The first hypothesis in the present study was

not supported; it was found that there was no relationship between one’s awareness of mediated
privacy and awareness of the persistence affordance. Instead, it was found that a positive
relationship existed between awareness of privacy and awareness of visibility and encryption
affordances. In other words, participants who reported to be aware of and concerned about their
online privacy were likely to also report a knowledge of their online presence being visible to
others (even outside of their social networks) and/or knowing of/having used encryption tools that
are specifically for masking one’s online presence. This finding also answered the first research
question, that asked which mediated affordance (between visibility, persistence, and encryption)
was correlated with positive awareness of privacy. Thus, the affordances with the most significant
relationship to awareness of privacy were encryption and visibility.
With regard to H2, it was found that a positive relationship existed between awareness of
mediated privacy and awareness of surveillance. This means that participants who reported to be
aware of and concerned about their online privacy were also likely to report being aware of and
concerned about online surveillance.
Finally, the final research question asked about the relationship between the modality of
an invasive application’s privacy policy and one’s intentions to use that application and their
awareness of online privacy and online surveillance after reviewing that privacy policy. Although
it was found that there were no significant main effects between the kinds of policies shown and
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one’s self-reported awareness of online privacy and surveillance after viewing the privacy
following, there were two significant results found in the post hoc tests. Individuals who were
shown no privacy policy at all reported greater concerns for their online privacy than those who
were shown a privacy policy containing imagery for an application that offers personalized
services in exchange for data. Second, individuals who were shown a privacy policy containing
pictures for a health application that requires one’s data reported a greater concern for their online
privacy than those shown a privacy policy containing images for an application that offers
personalized services in exchange for data.
The post hoc content analysis supports this finding, as eight participants whose
qualitative responses were concerned with the data collection aspect of the application were
shown the health application’s privacy policy that contained pictures. This indicates that, when
participants were presented with a simplified privacy policy for a health-related application, they
had some initial concerns regarding data collection. This finding is also supported when taking
into account the frequencies of those who consented across the multiple experimental conditions
of this study. Although most participants consented to use the application overall, the few
instances of individuals not consenting in greater numbers than consenting participants occurred
amongst those who were shown the health application’s partial and picture policy.
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Table 4.1
Codebook of Themes with Message Examples
Theme Name

Theme Description

Exemplar

The general topic of the
application’s data
collection/sharing aspect

“I chose that I wouldn’t consent
solely because I don’t think I’d be
comfortable with the app accessing
my social media as I don’t see a
reason that it would need to.”

Additional
Information
Requests

Uncertainty surrounding the
application to the point of
explicitly asking for more
information, such as being
unsure of what the purpose of
the application

“I would need to read up more on
what it offers but it sounds like a
good idea.”

Policy/Notification
Language Request

Feedback and/or requests for
modifying the application’s
privacy policy and/or
notification

“Maybe add more info about which
brand of item is being ‘dropped’”

Simple
Opinion/Intention

Focuses on the participant’s
opinion of/intention to use the
application without justification
as to why.

“This is a great idea!”

Technological
Feature Concerns

Concerns related to specific
technological features of the
application outside of its data
collection requests

“I usually don’t like to turn on
GPS.”

Utilitarian SelfReflection

Focuses on participants’
utilitarian needs in relation to
the application and/or selfreflection regarding the fit of
the app into their lifestyle

“I am probably out of the age range
for the use of this app. I have a
sone[sic] that uses Drops for several
items he has purchased. Good luck
with your app!”

Data Concerns
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
Communication research lacks contemporary explanation for what privacy is beyond
interpersonal phenomena (e.g., CPM; Petronio, 2013). Although theoretical frameworks
involving media use (e.g., MAIN; Sundar, 2008) contain rich predictions and conditions
regarding when and how a user might adopt a new technology, these models do not yet contain
discourse as it pertains to user privacy. The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and the resultant
pandemic have presented a unique opportunity to examine privacy and its related variables,
especially given the possibility of employing technologies that depend on citizens’ data to limit
the spread of the virus (Byford, 2020). Beyond the context of COVID-19, modern technological
advances and social media platforms require users to consent and hand over their personal data in
exchange for access. Thus, questions regarding data collection become intertwined with concerns
related to privacy (e.g., Cheung et al., 2016), surveillance (e.g., Martin et al., 2016), and citizens’
legal rights (Sirota, 2019) as well as more pertinent with the release and adoption of new
technologies.
The present study was framed to address several privacy-related issues. The first major
thrust was to explore which kinds of technological affordances were associated with greater
awareness of privacy. Next, the study sought to understand the relationship between privacy and
surveillance. The final area of focus questioned how the modality of a privacy policy factored
into individuals making privacy decisions. The overarching intention of this study is that it could
lay groundwork for a contemporary and timely discussion of privacy issues as it relates to
computer-mediated behavior.

47

5.1

Overview and Explanation of Hypotheses/Research Questions
5.1.1

H1, RQ1: Privacy Awareness and Awareness of Affordances

The first hypothesis (H1) posited that awareness of mediated privacy correlated
negatively with awareness of privacy affordances. In other words, the more one was aware of
their online privacy, the less aware they were in perceiving (and possibly utilizing) technological
affordances related to new media and technologies. Several justifications exist within the
literature for this hypothesis to be supported, be it related to the privacy paradox impacting users’
online behaviors (Barnes, 2006; Quinn, 2016), users overestimating their online invulnerability
(Shin et al., 2012), or users being cynical and/or apathetic when presented with the opportunity to
proactively protect their online privacy (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). However, the present study
found conflicting results.
The resultant correlations employed in the present study did not support this hypothesis.
While the results might be surprising given the ample literature supporting the notion of users
failing to acknowledge their abilities to utilize affordances that can protect their privacy, a more
thorough explanation can be found by discussing the results found from answering the study’s
first research question (RQ1) of which technological affordances (of visibility, persistence, and
encryption) were associated with greater awareness of privacy.
The present study found that a significant, weak, but positive, relationship existed
between participants’ awareness of mediated privacy and their awareness of visibility and
encryption. The study also found that no significant relationship existed between participants’
awareness of mediated privacy and their awareness of persistence. This implies that the more a
participant was aware of their privacy, the more they were aware of being found on social media
and/or aware of/currently employed specific technological affordances that feature encryption,
thus protecting their privacy more than if they had not used considered using these affordances.
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Although these findings might contrast with H1, there is much to unpack regarding how
participants in this study consider affordances related to social media and new technologies.
Visibility is an affordance that is described as being able to selectively display oneself in
an online setting, control how information is displayed to other users, and/or control being seen as
offline or online (Evans et al., 2017; Siegert & Löwstedt 2019). The positive relationship that
existed in the present study implies that the more aware one was of their online privacy, the more
they knew of and/or utilized features that increased/decreased the visibility of their online
presence. Within the context of privacy discourse, this could also refer to the default nature of
one’s online profile as being public or private and/or restricting the kinds of content that others
can see. This finding is relatively unsurprising, as it would make sense for one who is concerned
about their privacy to restrict their online presence and/or control who can see their online
profiles. Control over information and information boundaries is a key facet of privacy as it is
defined in the literature (Westin, 1967; Altman, 1975, 1977; Petronio, 2002, 2013), so seeing a
positive relationship between controlling an online profile’s information and concern about
privacy makes logical sense. Furthermore, prior research has indicated that users make conscious
decisions about who to become friends with, add, and/or follow on social media because of
privacy concerns (Ampong et al., 2018; Child et al., 2012; Choi & Bazarova, 2015; Ellison et al.,
2011; Quinn, 2016). The present study lends support to this literature in the sense that users are
cognizant of social media’s ability to limit content and network visibility. While this study does
not explicitly support the notion of individuals adjusting their visibility online for the outcome of
privacy, the findings indicate a possible perception and/or behavioral connection between
privacy-conscious users and users who actively monitor and utilize their online visibility.
The encryption affordance utilized in this study has not typically been discussed in
previous affordance literature (e.g., Evans et al., 2017). Instead, encryption-related affordances
tend to exist in the literature discussing their utilization and efficacy in applications (e.g.,
WhatsApp; Santos & Faure, 2018). Encryption measures can be linked to utilizing end-to-end
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encryption and/or employing a virtual private network (VPN) to browse the Internet. The positive
relationship that existed in the present study implies that the more aware one was of their online
privacy, the more they knew of and/or utilized features that encrypted their online presence.
Within the context of privacy discourse, this could also refer to users turning to services
specifically designed to preserve one’s online privacy. This finding is also unsurprising on a
surface level, as applications that feature these kinds of tools have existed as alternatives to
mainstream services, such as the case of WhatsApp. This means that it is likely that only
individuals who knew about specific encryption tools (e.g., end-to-end encryption), were
concerned about their online presence to learn about these tools, and actively utilized them (as
their specific purpose is for protecting one’s online privacy). Although popular messaging
services (e.g., Apple’s iMessage, Google’s Google Messages) are beginning to adopt end-to-end
encryption in their applications and make them available for users (Doffman, 2020a; Hesse,
2020), there is a greater barrier to entry in that most users have to opt in to utilizing these
affordances rather than having them automatically available as a default option. While this study
does not explicitly support the notion of individuals seeking out encryption services for the
outcome of privacy, the findings indicate a possible connection between privacy-conscious users
and users who actively know of and/or turn to services that feature encryption mechanisms.
Persistence is an affordance that has described the content of one’s online presence,
specifically with regard to that content being able to be archived for future reference (Ellison et
al., 2015) and/or durable to the point of that content being able to retain its integrity for others to
interpret at any time, at a later time (Treem & Lombardi, 2012). Within the context of this study,
knowledge of persistence existed as being aware of or concerned about users utilizing the
screenshot function to preserve their own and/or other users’ social media content. The present
study found no significant relationship between awareness of one’s privacy and awareness of the
persistence affordance. This finding is inconsistent with prior privacy research on social media. A
common concern among young adults and teenagers on social media is that their families can see,
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and easily reference, their online behaviors; addressing this concern requires users to face the
existence of social media persistence and actively edit/delete content that might be unsavory in
the eyes of one’s Yia Yia (Child & Westermann, 2013). This finding becomes less surprising
considering the most popular forms of social media used by participants in this study. The
overwhelming majority (over 90%!) of the participants in this study reported that they used
Snapchat and/or Instagram. At the time of writing, both of these applications prominently feature
the ability to directly send self-destructing messages and/or images to another, sharing sequences
of images/videos (i.e., Stories) that other users can opt into viewing that expire after a certain
amount of time, as well as private Stories that are only viewable by others that the user
specifically selects (Bradford, 2018; Delfino, 2019). In other words, these applications
preemptively resolve the concern of persistence by making non-permanent forms of
communication the default means of communicating with other users. Thus, the lack of
relationship between participants’ self-reported awareness of privacy and awareness of
persistence lend support to the idea that young adults have moved on to using non-permanent
forms of social media where persistence is not a primary concern, if at all.
Another explanation for the lack of relationship between the study’s participants’ selfreported awareness of privacy and awareness of persistence can be explained when taking into
account the relationship between participants’ awareness of privacy and awareness of encryption.
These encryption tools, be it proxies, VPNs, and end-to-end encryption, allow for a user to
anonymize their web presence in the sense that their activity is encrypted, hashed (i.e.,
anonymized), forwarded to other random data stations, and then decrypted once it reaches its final
destination (Montieri et al., 2018). This means that these tools provide users with the ability to
mask their online presence, thus preemptively addressing a concern of their content persisting. If
it is exceedingly difficult to trace content back to its source thanks to encryption tools, then there
is little reason for a user to be actively concerned about their content persisting in an online
context.
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In sum, the answer to the study’s first research question is as follows: awareness of
visibility and encryption are nearly equally correlated to awareness of privacy. Although the
correlation between encryption and privacy is slightly stronger than visibility and privacy, both
correlations have a negligible difference when both correlation values are well in the region of a
weak relationship.

5.1.2

H2: Privacy Awareness and Awareness of Surveillance

The second hypothesis (H2) posited that awareness of mediated privacy correlated
positively with awareness of surveillance. In other words, the more aware of/concerned a
participant was about their online privacy, the more aware of/concerned a participant was about
online surveillance. The resultant correlation supported this hypothesis to a significant extent.
This finding is consistent with surveillance literature that bemoaned the lack of privacy in public
spaces (e.g., airports; Adey, 2006), the workplace (Kizza & Ssanyu, 2005; Lim, 2002; Mujtaba,
2003), in online settings (Caluya, 2010), or even by proxy thanks to amateur recording (i.e., an
individual is technically under surveillance in a video posted to social media even if they are in
the background of that video; Koskela, 2004, 2009). On face, this positive relationship makes
sense: If one is concerned about being under surveillance, they are most likely concerned about
their privacy being invaded because they are being watched, too. Another explanation for this
significantly strong relationship could exist when the privacy paradox and culture of surveillance
are considered together. Prior research has indicated that our behaviors drastically change when
we are suddenly made aware of being under surveillance (Martin et al., 2016; Sarpong & Rees,
2014). Given that individuals are apathetic about their privacy until something tangible occurs
that violates that privacy (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016), it would make sense for that apathy to
occur when under constant surveillance rather than sudden surveillance. The present study lends
support to the notion that privacy concerns and surveillance concerns are intertwined to a certain
extent: these variables are related in the sense that users face the concerns retroactively rather
than proactively.
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5.1.3

RQ2: Privacy Policy Modality and Privacy Decisions

The study’s second research question (RQ2) sought to understand the relationship
between the modality of a privacy policy and awareness of surveillance, intentions to use an
invasive application, and awareness of privacy. As this question was answered using mixed
methods, there is much to interpret.
The first 2x3 factorial ANOVA focused on the six experimental conditions and the
usability subscale. This specific ANOVA was conducted because participants in the control
condition did not see the usability scale; only participants who were shown an application and
privacy policy in one of the six experimental conditions had the opportunity to answer the
usability questions. The resultant ANOVA found no significant main effect between a participant
shown a different type of application (i.e., health or personalization), a modality of privacy policy
(i.e., full, partial, or picture), and intention to use an application. Individual differences between
groups were found to lack significance, as well. At first glance, this might mean that users’
intentions to use a privacy-invasive application is not predicted by the kind of application and
how the consent documentation is presented. Given that consent processes are routinized to the
point of users opting to skip past them entirely (Ploug & Holm, 2013), it would be plausible to
interpret this finding as lax participants being unphased by privacy policies. Taken alone,
modality might not matter. However, it would be dangerous to come to such a conclusion without
examining the results from the second ANOVA.
The second 2x3x1 factorial ANOVA was conducted between the six experimental
conditions, the control condition, and the privacy awareness subscale. All participants were
shown the privacy awareness scale, thus an ANOVA involving all of the groups could be
conducted. Consistent with the prior ANOVA, there was no significant main effect between the
type of privacy policy displayed, the type of application displayed, and awareness of mediated
privacy. This might mean that, similar to the prior interpretation, the type of application or
privacy policy modality does not determine one’s awareness of online privacy. This surface level
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finding can be explained as an example of the privacy paradox in which participants report being
aware of their privacy yet failing to act and preserve it (Barnes, 2006). For the case of this study,
a significant effect could indicate a departure from this paradox; participants recognizing the
privacy invasive nature of the application and reporting heightened awareness of privacy could
indicate some effect coming from the privacy policy. This was not the case here.
The post hoc tests told a slightly different story, however. Participants in the control
condition reported greater awareness of privacy than those in the personalization picture policy
condition. In other words, this means that individuals shown no privacy policy reported greater
concerns about their privacy than those showing a condensed privacy policy containing images
for an application that personalizes content for the user depending on their interests. Considering
the personalization paradox, in which individuals knowingly give away their data (i.e., privacy) in
exchange for personalized services (Aguirre et al., 2015), it would make sense for individuals to
report less concern for their privacy if it means they get a unique experience. The present study’s
participants seemed to respond favorably in the form of having decreased privacy concerns when
presented with an opportunity to have a tailored and customized experience. This finding is
consistent with prior research in that customization and personalization were appealing enough
for participants to look past privacy concerns (Sundar & Marathe, 2010). Moreover, it can be
assumed that participants shown a condensed privacy policy containing pictures had the
opportunity to understand the terms and conditions to the point of relaxing their vigilance and
look forward to using an application fit for them. If this is the case, then it can also be assumed
that the policy was instrumental in achieving a level of informed consent (Rossi & Palmirani,
2017). However, knowing the demographics of participants in this study being generally young
adults completing this survey for college credit as well as how routinized consent procedures are
(Ploug & Holm, 2013), it would be a significant (yet optimistic) stretch to assume that true
consent was being obtained during the course of this study.

54

The continued post hoc tests also indicated that participants in the health picture policy
condition reported greater awareness of privacy than those in the personalization picture policy
condition. This means that those who were shown a health application with a summarized privacy
policy containing pictures reported greater privacy concerns than those who were shown a
summarized privacy policy for an application that tailors content for users depending on their
interests. Like the previous post hoc results, this could be another example of the personalization
paradox at play (Aguirre et al., 2015), in which participants’ concerns were assuaged after
knowing that an experience was being tailored. Modality might matter in this case. However,
when taking into account the supplemental qualitative analyses, an alternative (and richer)
explanation regarding this difference becomes clear.
The supplemental content analyses conducted on the usability and qualitative responses
yield a deeper understanding as to why those in the health picture policy condition reported
greater concerns than those in the personalization picture policy condition. First, when examining
the differences in consenting frequencies among those in these conditions, the health picture
policy condition featured the most instances of those not consenting rather than consenting. Of
the few who were unsure and opted to read more in this specific condition, all of them did not
consent. Conversely, of the few participants who opted to read more in the personalization picture
condition, all of them consented to use this application. Although there were only eight
participants who opted to read more in the policy condition (four in health, four in
personalization), this polar trend of consenting versus not consenting is worth nothing when
discussing concerns of the health application and the personalization paradox. This finding seems
to be consistent with the anti-contact tracing sentiment that was reported in the media early on in
the pandemic, where many individuals were quite hesitant about the efficacy and true intentions
of the contact tracing efforts (Browne, 2020; Dev, 2020; Feibus, 2020). While this concern (and
unwillingness) might not be stemming from the modality of policy itself, it can explain the lack
of consenting participants in the health condition.
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The content analysis of the application feedback explains some of this concern, too.
While most comments were negative or neutral (i.e., vague or lacking a clear opinion of the
application itself), the most common theme was that involving data concerns. Regarding their
data, participants either explicitly described their intentions (i.e., “I will not openly give any app
my personal information”) or their opinions regarding being watched altogether (i.e., “…however
i have second thought about information release to third party services”). In the context of this
study, this means that participants were most likely to express concerns about the application’s
data collection features, its requiring user data, and/or concerns about what will be done with that
data. This finding is consistent with research on cutting edge eHealth technologies that require
participant data to function (Cheung et al., 2016). Although contact tracing is not a cutting-edge
technology (see Bernard et al., 2018), the contexts of the COVID-19 pandemic and participants
viewing an unreleased application would classify this pool of participants as potential early
adopters when considering DoI (Rogers, 1962). For the case of this study, early adopters were
quite concerned with the health application and their privacy to the point of opting out of using
that new technology when presented with a privacy policy that was easier to understand. Thus,
privacy risks posed a threat to the potential adoption of a new technology aimed at mitigating the
spread of COVID-19 (a trend predicted by Bernstein [2006]).
The final 2x3x1 factorial ANOVA was conducted between the six experimental
conditions, the control condition, and the surveillance subscale. All participants were shown the
surveillance scale, thus an ANOVA involving all of the groups could be conducted. Consistent
with the first ANOVA, there was no significant main effect between the type of privacy policy
displayed, the type of application displayed, and awareness of surveillance. There were no
significant differences within the individual groups, as well. While this might be an unexpected
finding, the similarities between the first and third ANOVAs support the idea that there is
significant overlap between awareness of privacy and surveillance. In the context of this study, if
there were no main effects between privacy policy modality and privacy subscale, a similar lack
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of main effects should exist between privacy policy modality. In this case, modality might not
matter given the correlation between surveillance and privacy awareness.
Does the modality of a privacy policy matter among individuals making privacy
decisions? The short answer is…it depends. On a surface level, the lack of main effects in most of
the ANOVAs conducted in this study indicates that modality does not matter; users will routinely
and blindly consent to use an application in a dismissive fashion (especially if its privacy policy is
unstandardized, lacks plain language, and prevents individuals from becoming informed when
consenting; Katulić & Katulić, 2018; Rossi & Palmirani, 2017). However, the individual
differences that occurred between participants shown a health application with a policy
containing pictures, personalization application containing pictures, and no privacy policy at all
highlights a unique role a privacy policy played when participants were tasked with making a
decision about their online privacy. In this study, the privacy policy commodified privacy in that
participants had to answer the question of if their data was worth the exchange outlined in the
policy (thus granting them potential access to the application). For the health application, a policy
containing pictures (and assumedly allowing for greater comprehension) led to users feeling that
their data was not worth access, even during the pandemic. For the personalization application, a
policy containing pictures (and assumedly allowing for greater comprehension) led users to feel
that exchanging their privacy for access to a new service was worth it. Thus, the modality of a
policy could matter among users making decisions regarding their privacy, though it depends on
the context.

5.2

Implications of Findings and Future Directions
The findings of the present study demonstrate potential for multiple social scientific fields

that study privacy, policymakers seeking to implement data-informed improvements to privacy
policies, and stakeholders seeking to address the privacy paradox. Although some of the findings
in the present study lack significance, there is reason to consider the smaller findings with
cautious optimism.
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5.2.1

Theoretical Implication: Toward a contemporary conceptualization, and
theory, of privacy.

Privacy remains a concept worth addressing (Margulis, 1977, 2003); at the very
minimum, a theory of privacy should encompass contemporary communication behaviors as well
as privacy issues of the status quo. Regardless of its prior framing as a human process (Altman,
1975, 1977), a communication tactic (Petronio, 2002), or a human right (Papacharissi, 2010;
Sayre & Dahling, 2016; Warren & Brandeis, 1890), the present study contributes to an effort of
elevating/revisiting the problem of privacy in the status quo. The definition of privacy (i.e.,
mediated privacy) that framed the present study was contingent on one having the right to conceal
information so long as they remain in control of that information. Those who participated in this
study tested this notion when they were presented with the option of giving away their data in
exchange for access to a new application. In doing so, it can be argued that consenting to use
either of the applications employed in the present study shaved away one’s right to privacy in that
control of one’s personal data, even in the form of indicating one’s favorite shoe brand, becomes
a shared responsibility between a data owner (i.e., the user) and a data controller (i.e., the
application collecting the data).
One goal of this study was to understand the relationship between privacy and
surveillance, two concepts that are assumedly connected when examined at face value. Although
Monahan’s (2011) definition of surveillance frames it as an invasive process governing one’s
behavior (thus contrasting with several interpretations of privacy; cf. Altman, 1975, 1977),
legitimizing its relationship with a related concept (i.e., privacy) is a step in the right direction for
delineating these concepts in the future. The present study found that a positive and significant
relationship existed between awareness of mediated privacy and awareness of surveillance. This
finding is important for two reasons.
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First, highlighting this relationship is important for privacy scholars seeking to position
privacy alongside similar concepts. Surveillance literature has demonstrated that individuals
change their behaviors when they are made aware of the act of surveillance taking place (Lim,
2002; Kizza & Ssanyu, 2005; Mujtaba, 2003). Knowing the positive relationship demonstrated in
this study paves the way for opportunities to address underlying surveillance concerns, and in
turn, privacy concerns. For example, scholars wanting to examine the effects of surveillance can
now examine privacy awareness in their research. Second, the relationship between these two
concepts noted in this study demonstrate a future need to differentiate these concepts for future
research operationalization. For instance, if we are to consider Monahan’s (2011)
conceptualization, a future direction could be to understand the difference between active
surveillance (e.g., being constantly monitored in the workplace; Kizza & Ssanyu, 2005) and
passive surveillance (e.g., learning that one was under surveillance when they end up in the
background of someone else’s video posted on social media; Koskela, 2004, 2009). Both forms of
surveillance can be associated with privacy risks outlined foretold by 6 (1998), but contemporary
privacy issues could dictate which type of surveillance sparks more pressing privacy concerns,
thus better defining privacy as it relates to contemporary privacy issues.
Future privacy research can benefit from the reflexive approach adopted in this study.
boyd’s (2012) recommendation of decentering the individual as the unit of analysis (as it pertains
to privacy research) lacked a means of operationalization; the present study made an attempt at
operationalizing that recommendation by examining privacy from the affordance theoretical
perspective, which brought its own set of implications for media researchers.

5.2.2

Theoretical Implication: Reconsidering privacy from an affordance
perspective.

Gibson’s (1986) interpretation of an affordance is admittedly naturalistic when used to
reference new media and technology phenomena. Contemporary communication affordance
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research involving social media might examine how users interact with a social media platform
(e.g., Aladwani, 2017) or how social media impacts behaviors (e.g., Rice et al., 2017). For the
case of the present study, an affordance perspective examined what features offered by social
media were related to awareness of privacy. The three affordances examined in the present study
were visibility, persistence, and encryption.
A goal of this study was to understand which technological affordances were associated
with greater awareness of privacy. It was assumed that, given the privacy paradox causing users
to give away their privacy yet being concerned about it (Quinn, 2016) and individuals
demonstrating apathy when presented with an opportunity to address their lack of privacy
preservation (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016), participants in this study would indicate greater
awareness of privacy and lesser awareness of technological affordances on social media that can
be associated with privacy (i.e., a negative relation). The lack of support for H1 is important
because it offers an alternative explanation for user behavior impacted by the privacy paradox. If
users are aware of some technological affordances (as demonstrated in this study), yet concerned
about their privacy, this indicates that users might not be apathetic. In fact, this disconnection
between concern and action could be explained by something else altogether, such as a lack of
knowledge. Future affordance research should examine that disconnection in attempt to explain
the root causes of the privacy paradox.
Another important implication from this study can be found in the lack of a relationship
between privacy awareness and awareness of the persistence affordance. Persistence is a social
media affordance frequently discussed in computer-mediated communication (CMC) and social
media literature relating to content being able to persist in the form of archived for future
reference and retaining most of its structure, so its meaning is not misconstrued (Ellison et al.,
2015; Treem & Leonardi, 2012). Although persistence itself might vary by platform and medium
(Evans et al., 2017), the lack of a relationship between privacy awareness and visibility awareness
marks a trend worth nothing for future affordance literature: Persistence is becoming less of a
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default and prominent affordance found on social media, and in turn, CMC. In the present study,
the overwhelming majority of participants reported to use Snapchat and Instagram, two social
media platforms that prominently feature ephemeral media in the form of self-destructing
messages and images (Bradford, 2018; Delfino, 2019). Snapchat users circumvent the default
notion of persistent media by sending a picture to someone else that can be viewed exactly once.
Although a level of persistence still technically exists in the form of users utilizing the screenshot
function of their devices when opening a self-destructing message, these users have to
specifically opt into doing so by learning how to screenshot on their device, predict an incoming
message to be valuable enough to be preserved via screenshot, and recognizing the fact that
Snapchat notifies all parties in a conversation that a screenshot was taken (perhaps in an attempt
to mitigate abusive behavior and encourage a reciprocal culture of engaging in ephemeral
communication on the platform). This finding is important for a few reasons.
First, this finding demonstrates a need to reclassify persistence as an affordance that is no
longer the default on contemporary social media platforms (cf. Evans et al., 2017). Given that
new social media platforms are giving users more control over their data and how they interact
with others through the introduction of new features (and their impacts on the average user),
affordance literature must catch up and reclassify common/default communication/technological
affordances offered by social media. Second, this finding demonstrates a need for a new
affordance to be examined by the literature: Evanescence. Similar to face-to-face (FtF)
communication, which is fleeting by default in the sense that all human participants in a
communication interaction lack the ability to preserve the messages being exchanged without a
recording device, evanescence could refer to a unique type of ephemeral CMC where the message
sender dictates ephemerality of the message prior to sending it to someone else (who might or
might not have the capability of preserving the messages being sent).
The present study lacked a singular overarching theoretical framework that framed the
study based on a singular line of literature. Instead, it incorporated several theoretical
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backgrounds to be reflexive while also offering competing explanations for the paradoxes of
privacy and personalization in the status quo.

5.2.3

Theoretical Implication: Reconsidering privacy within the contexts of DoI
and MAIN.

Diffusion of Innovation (DoI) and the MAIN model are two sets of media use

frameworks that attempt to predict when and/or why a new technology/media is adopted by an
audience. For the case of DoI, this can help in classifying kinds of users and offer an explanation
as to when users might adopt this new technology (thus predicting its success and eventual
diffusion across a population; English, 2016; Rogers, 1962; Schwartz & Grimm, 2017). For the
case of the MAIN model, this can help in classifying what affordances and/or heuristics might be
appealing to users that encourages them to continue to use specific technologies or media forms
(Sundar, 2008). While the present study did not have a specific goal framed around these
theoretical frameworks, the findings yielded by the supplemental analyses, particularly the
consent frequencies and content analyses, offer opportunities for media and privacy scholars to
consider. The present study found that there were multiple instances where early adopters opted
out of using a new health application that could be considered to be privacy invasive and this
could be important for a number of reasons.
First, this finding demonstrates that an opportunity exists for these theories to be tested
using technologies and media forms from multiple contexts beyond general media use, such as
using new health technologies. While some literature exists briefly describing the thoughts of
hesitant early adopters of new health technologies (Cheung et al., 2016), this hesitancy cannot be
explained by DoI nor MAIN. Given the similar health hesitancy experienced by participants in
this study, it is imperative for future research to address the contextual deficiency that exists from
both DoI and MAIN. Second, the findings of this study indicate that these models need to clearly
take privacy into account. Given that a relationship exists between privacy awareness and certain
technological affordances, an opportunity exists in further understanding the role privacy
awareness plays in media and technological adoption. The present study contains findings
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consistent with prior personalization paradox research that hypothesizes and discusses how
privacy awareness predicts attitudes of new technologies (Bernstein, 2006; Cho et al., 2020;
Sundar & Marathe, 2010). While privacy might not be an outcome variable, it acts as a predictive
variable worth exploring in future research on technological adoption and media diffusion.
While the present study offered much to communication theory and media use theories,
there are practical implications related to privacy policy modalities that are worth noting for
scholars, policymakers, and other stakeholders who have a vested interest in updating privacy
policies to be compliant with contemporary legislation while also being data-informed.

5.2.4

Practical Implication: Much ado about privacy policies.

The privacy policy has become the focus of examination by both lawmakers and scholars
alike. Privacy legislation such as the GDPR (GDPR, 2016) and CCPA (Sirota, 2019) has aimed to
protect the privacy of citizens on multiple fronts, one of which being the standardization and
clarification of privacy policies. Again, answering the question whether or not privacy policies
actually meet their goals of protecting privacy is outside of the scope of this study. Instead, a goal
of this study was to examine differences in how users interacted with several modalities of
privacy policies. These manufactured policies were constructed to be consistent with prior
recommendations of privacy researchers, in which policies should be summarized, contain
pictures, contain clear language, and ensure that a level of informed consent can be met by the
end user (Katulić & Katulić, 2018; Ploug & Holm, 2013; Rossi & Palmirani, 2017). Although
there were virtually no main effects between participants’ awareness of usability, privacy,
surveillance and modality of privacy policy shown, the few significant individual differences
noted in the present study are worth discussing.
First, it can be assumed that participants initially shown the picture policies and then
opting to read the full policies for the health and personalization applications were able to
comprehend the policies just enough to warrant a consistent trend of health participants not
consenting and personalization participants consenting to use the application in an extreme
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fashion. This bipolarity of consent did not occur in the partial policy condition. This finding is
important for privacy researchers or policymakers who want to better understand how to raise
comprehension levels and limit users from blindly consenting (see Rossi & Palmirani, 2017).
However, future research should examine privacy policy modality further to gauge
comprehension from users reading privacy policies that have been standardized with informed
consent in mind. Second, the hesitancy among participants in the health subconditions (i.e., health
picture, health partial) and their qualitative feedback regarding their data indicate that a level of
user concern needs to be addressed by researchers, lawmakers, and developers of these health
applications to allow for users to consent without concern. However, this might prove ethically
difficult (see Pollach, 2005). Privacy policies and consent documentation require the use of plain
language, elaborated procedures for addressing concerns, and rich and detailed descriptions of
the legal and/or research processes that will be taking place. This could mean that too much
information in health contexts might be raising an equal level of user concern as too little
information. Thus, researchers, lawmakers, developers, and practitioners have an opportunity to
reframe information on these privacy policies and consent documentation in a way that meets
guidelines set forth by legal bodies, are ethically and morally consistent with health research, and
assuage concerns users might have prior to reading that policy.
Outside of practical implications for privacy policies and privacy research, the present
study’s findings involving the encryption affordance offer implications for privacy researchers
and developers to consider going forward.

5.2.5

Theoretical & Practical Implications: Encryption, end users, and you.

The encryption affordance discussed and analyzed in this study is not a technological
affordance often discussed in affordance classification literature (e.g., Evans et al., 2017;
Rathnayake & Winter, 2018). Instead, the present study operationalized measuring knowledge of
encryption affordances by referencing mechanisms and processes that encrypt one’s online
presence in the status quo (e.g., Santos & Faure, 2018). The present study found that a positive
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relationship existed between knowledge of encryption affordances and awareness of privacy.
Knowing that these affordances have primarily existed as opt-in affordances for technologically
savvy users, this finding is important for two reasons.
First, this relationship demonstrates that affordance classifications can be updated to
include technological affordances specifically created for privacy. The encryption affordances
referenced in this study (i.e., VPNs, end-to-end encryption, proxies) were comprised of
mechanisms that were created and utilized specifically for masking one’s online presence (thus
allowing them to browse the web in a private fashion; Doffman, 2020a; Hesse, 2020; Santos &
Faure, 2018). Thus, affordance classifications should be updated by media scholars to include
affordances that involve outcome variables such as privacy. Second, given that any relationship
exists, let alone positive, between knowledge of encryption affordances and awareness of privacy,
this means that developers, privacy scholars, and legislators can safely assume that individuals
are slowly becoming tech-savvy enough to at least recognize the existence and efficacy of these
encryption affordances. This does not mean that messaging services and platforms should ease off
making services such as end-to-end encryption available by default. The addition of making this
feature the default form of messaging on mainstream messaging platforms such as Apple’s
iMessage (Doffman 2020a) and Google’s Google Messages are a step in the direction of
accounting for the average user being the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain (Culp, 2016).
Developers and privacy scholars should consider allowing users to opt out of using these
technologies (assuming that opting out of such an encryption mechanism provides a user with
benefits in very select circumstances) rather than hoping that the users are smart enough and/or
proactive to opt into such a service.

5.3

Limitations and Future Research
Although these results have been interpreted with optimism in a grim reality that features

the privacy paradox, the present study has several limitations. First, the present study relied
entirely on self-report mechanisms. Future privacy research could account for this limitation by
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introducing another point of measurement, such as requesting individuals submit proof of their
privacy settings.
Second, the population was sampled from a large Southern University, meaning that it is
exceedingly difficult to make claims about an average user. Future research should consider
sampling from multiple demographics for a more holistic understanding of average user behavior
in mediated settings.
Third, although the affordance measures created for and utilized in this study had
sufficient reliability, the submeasures themselves were comprised of very few items (in some
cases, three items). In some cases, there were concerns regarding the measures, construct validity.
For example, persistence is an affordance that manifests itself in fashions outside of the
screenshotting social media content. Therefore, it would behoove future research to create an
affordance measurement scale as a way to broaden affordance measures and include items that
can measure these affordances in a variety of ways while also maintaining high reliability values.
Fourth, the study lacked a means of gauging the extent of participants’ comprehension of
the privacy policies themselves. There could have been situations where participants blindly
scrolled to the bottom of the page in search of the “I consent” button. Although prior research
recommends the use of short quizzes (e.g., Rossi & Palmirani, 2017), no such comprehension
check was in place. Future research on privacy policy modalities should include a comprehension
check to account for such a limitation.
Fifth, the study’s design was limited in its ability to account for privacy’s nuance. Privacy
policies are uniform in nature; they are constructed in compliance with ethical, legal, and moral
obligations (Angulo et al., 2012; Ploug & Holm, 2013; Pollach, 2005). Privacy, as well as the
privacy paradox, require significant levels of nuance that are unable to be accounted for in a rigid
study (such as this one); privacy is studied in a significant number of contexts. When trying to
leverage results from the present study in relation to other contextual privacy research, cross
comparisons become difficult to make. In short, it becomes difficult to compare the results from
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this study to another privacy study given the lack of uniformity of privacy research. To account
for this limitation, it is recommended that specific contexts of privacy are focused on for a holistic
understanding of how privacy operates within that specific context.
Finally, the study was limited in its narrow ecological validity. Participants technically
knew they were contributing to research all along, as they were participating in research for
course credit and had to read through a consent document that reminded them of their research
participation. Although IRB-approved deception measures were implemented in an attempt to
simulate a consent obtaining process, there very well could have been users who “consented” on
the fake application because they knew their data was being collected. To account for this
limitation, future research should consider the route of participant observation and/or the use of
psychophysiological measures that track movement (e.g., eye tracking) to gauge the attention of
participants and determine if they’re actually reading and comprehending the content.

5.4

Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to better understand the extent to which one perceives their

policy and affordances related to individuals perceiving their privacy when presented with
privacy policies of different modalities, as well as understand the relationship between
individuals’ self-reported privacy beliefs and their awareness of online privacy. The goal of this
study was to contribute to a body of literature that lacks contemporary explanations for privacy
and reflexive approaches for addressing problems related to online privacy. Although it was
found that there were no main effects between modality of policy shown and awareness of
surveillance nor privacy, there were significant individual differences between two conditions
that were shown a privacy policy containing pictures. Furthermore, it was found that a positive
relationship existed between awareness of privacy and surveillance as well as awareness of
privacy and awareness of visibility and encryption. While the findings in this study were limited
by multiple factors, the present study offers implications for scholars, legislators, and other
stakeholders who seek to preserve the privacy of the end user. The problem of privacy will not be
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solved over the course of a single dissertation project, nor is it technically dead. Instead, the
boundaries of privacy are constantly evolving in tandem with technological advances; future
privacy research should be mindful of these findings and evolve in tandem with privacy’s
boundaries.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. STUDY MEASURES
Unless otherwise noted, all items will be presented in a 7-item Likert-type (strongly
disagree to strongly agree) scale.
[INSERT CONSENT LETTER HERE]
Do you consent to participate in this study?
Yes No
[page break]
Text
Before we begin this study, we’d love to get to know a little more about you.
Sociodemographics
How old are you?: ____
What is your gender? M/F/FtM/MtF/Nonbinary/Other:___________
What is your sexuality?: Heterosexual, G, L, B, A, Other: ____________
What is your ethnicity?: American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander,
Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, White/Caucasian, Other: __________
What is your relationship status?: Single never married, in a committed relationship,
domestic partnership, married, widowed, divorced.
What is your current class standing?: Fresh, Soph, Jr, Sr
What is your political alignment?: Liberal, Conservative, Independent, Unsure,
Other:_______
How many apps have you installed on your phone? (Please estimate) ______________
Which kind of smartphone do you have? Android, iOS, I do not have a smartphone
Social Media Use
Which social media platforms do you use? Please check all that apply: Facebook,
Snapchat, Reddit, Twitter, TikTok, Instagram, LinkedIn, tumblr, Other:______, None of
the above
How often do you check your social media? Hourly, Multiple times a day, A few times
during the day, at least once a day, a few times a week, a few times a month, less than a
few times a month
[page break]
Text
Thank you, once again, for participating in this study! We are in the process of testing a
brand new smartphone application, and we would love your input! On the next page, you

will learn about this new application. Then, we will show you its privacy policy. Then,
we will ask you for your feedback on this application. Please click the arrow below to
continue.
>>
[page break]
Qualtrics will then randomly assign participants to one of the following seven conditions
with the QUOTA logic to ensure that all conditions have a near-equal amount of
participants.
Condition 1: Health
The application is called CoronaWatch. This application will continuously have access
to your current location (GPS), your device’s battery life, your network information
(WiFi), as well as monitoring your device’s Bluetooth. As it tracks your daily routine, it
will also connect to other students’ devices (via Bluetooth). By signing up to use this
application, you will asked to consent to receive advertisements and announcements from
the University.
In a scenario where you come in contact with someone who tests positive for COVID-19,
CoronaWatch will alert you with a notification (see image below). You will then be
directed to immediately self-isolate. Opening the notification will show you further
instructions. Please see the notification below, as we will be asking you for feedback on
the app’s notifications.
[image goes here]
>>
Here is the application’s privacy policy.
Subcondition A: Full Policy
SubCondition B: Partial Policy
Subcondition C: Picture Policy
>>
Condition 2: Personalization
The application we are creating is called DropWatch, an application for automatically
entering exclusive product release raffles (aka “Drops”). This application will need an
Internet connection (WiFi or mobile data) as well as your GPS to show you content
that is relevant to your interests and your location. By signing up to use this application,
you will be asked to consent to receive announcements and advertisements from
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DropWatch and our advertising partners. When you first open the application, you
will be asked to select your favorite clothing brands. When your selected clothing brands
announce an upcoming drop, DropWatch will notify your automatic entry in that drop
with a notification (see image below). Opening the notification will show you more
information about the Drop. Please see the notification below, as we will be asking you
for feedback on the app's notifications."
[image goes here]
>>
[page break]
Subcondition A: Full Policy
SubCondition B: Partial Policy
Subcondition C: Picture Policy
Condition 3: Control
We’re sorry, but the application is not available to be shared yet. We’re going back to the
drawing board to come up with the next great thing! Please proceed to the next part of the
survey.
USABILITY ITEMS (Control will not be given these items)
Text
We would love your feedback on this application! Please indicate your agreement with
the following statements.
I think that this application is something I will need.
I plan on installing this application on my smartphone.
The app’s notification contains just enough information for me to understand.
If I received this notification on my smartphone, I will open it for more information.
Written out feedback will be used in content analysis
If you have any other feedback you want to give us, please enter it in the text box below.
[insert text box here]
>>
[page break]
Text
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Thank you for your feedback! We really appreciate it! Next, we would like to ask you
some more questions. (ORDER OF QUESTIONS TBA)

Privacy Awareness (Aldhafferi et al., 2013; Dinev & Hart, 2005; Koohang, 2017;
Krasnova et al., 2009)
Concern Subscale
It bothers me when social media sites ask me to provide personal information.
When social media sites ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before
providing it.
I am concerned that social media sites are collecting personal information about me.
I am concerned about providing my information to apps because of what others might do
with my information.
I am concerned about submitting my information to apps because it could be used in a
way that I did not forsee.
I am often concerned that a social network provider could store my information for the
next couple of years
Every now and then I feel anxious that a social network provider might know too much
about me.
Awareness Subscale
I am worried about the misuse of my personal information
It is ok for my account provider (such as Facebook) to share my profile information with
other websites **
I do not mind adding an unknown person as a friend **
I use real personal information on my social media account **
I am comfortable with strangers seeing my profile **
Knowledge and Utilization of Affordances (Evans et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2019;
Santos & Faure, 2018; Siegert & Löwstedt 2019).
Visibility (see Evans et al., 2017)
I know how to adjust the visibility of my social media profiles.
I have adjusted the visibility of my social media profiles.
I know how to restrict my social media posts so that only a select number of people can
see it.
I have restricted my social profile so that only a select number of people can see it.
Persistence (Evans et al., 2017; Siegert & Löwstedt, 2019)
I have taken screen shots of my friends’ social media posts.
I know that some of my friends have taken screen shots of my social media posts.
Before I post something to social media, I worry about who might take a screen shot of
my post. **
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I prefer to use non-permanent forms of social media, such as Snapchat and Instagram
Direct.
I prefer to use permanent forms of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. **
I prefer to use forms of social media that lack public profiles. **
Other tech affordances (Santos & Faure, 2018)
I prefer to use messaging applications featuring end-to-end encryption.
I have used apps that feature end-to-end encryption.
I prefer to use a virtual private network (VPN) when I connect to the Internet.
I prefer to connect to the Internet through a proxy server.
Awareness of Surveillance
I have said something and have received an advertisement about it shortly after.
I am aware that tagging myself at a location can make my information public.
I think that there are too many opportunities for someone to be recorded.
I think that there are too many types of ways to watch someone.
It is too easy to find someone on the Internet.
I do not mind being watched. **
I am concerned that I am being recorded.
**Indicates item was removed prior to running scale analyses.
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APPENDIX 2 STIMULI USED (PRIVACY POLICIES)
CONDITION: FULL POLICY
Privacy Policy
(If you are a user having your usual residence in the US)
Last update: January 1, 2020.
The Platform is provided and controlled by Watch Inc. (“Watch”, “we” or “us”). We are committed to
protecting and respecting your privacy. This Privacy Policy covers the experience we provide for all of our
users.
Capitalized terms that are not defined in this policy have the meaning given to them in the Terms of
Service.
What information do we collect?
We collect information when you create an account and use the Platform. We also collect information you
share with us from third-party social network providers, and technical and behavioral information about
your use of the Platform. More information about the categories and sources of information is provided
below.
Information you choose to provide
For certain activities, such as when you register, use the Platform, or contact us directly, you may provide
some or all of the following information:
•

Registration information, such as age, username and password, language, and email or phone
number

•

Profile information, such as name, social media account information, and profile image

•

Your opt-in choices and communication preferences

•

Information to verify an account

•

Information in correspondence you send to us

•

Information you share through surveys such as your gender, age, likeness, and preferences.

Information we obtain from other sources
We may receive the information described in this Privacy Policy from other sources, such as:
Social Media. if you choose to link or sign up using your social network (such as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, or Google), we may collect information from these social media services, including your contact
lists for these services and information relating to your use of the Platform in relation to these services.

Third-Party Services. We may collect information about you from third-party services, such as
advertising partners and analytics providers.
Others Users of the Platform. Sometimes other users of the Platform may provide us information about
you, including through customer service inquiries.
Other Sources. We may collect information about you from other publicly available sources.
Information we collect automatically
We automatically collect certain information from you when you use the Platform, including internet or
other network activity information such as your IP address, geolocation-related data (as described below),
unique device identifiers, and Cookies (as defined below).
Usage Information
We collect information regarding your use of the Platform. We also link your subscriber information with
your activity on our Platform across all your devices using your email, phone number, or similar
information.
Device Information
We collect information about the device you use to access the Platform, including your IP address, unique
device identifiers, model of your device, your mobile carrier, time zone setting, screen resolution, operating
system, app and file names and types, keystroke patterns or rhythms, and platform.
Location data
We collect information about your location, including location information based on your SIM card and/or
IP address. With your permission, we may also collect Global Positioning System (GPS) data.
Metadata
When you provide information to us, you automatically upload certain metadata that is connected to the
User Content. Metadata describes other data and provides information about your User Content that will
not always be evident to the viewer. In connection with your User Content the metadata can describe how,
when, and by whom the piece of User Content was collected and how that content is formatted. It also
includes information, such as your account name, that enables other users to trace back the User Content to
your user account. Additionally, metadata will consist of data that you chose to provide with your User
Content, e.g. any hashtags used to mark keywords to the video and captions.
Cookies
We and our service providers and business partners use cookies and other similar technologies (e.g. web
beacons, flash cookies, etc.) (“Cookies”) to automatically collect information, measure and analyze which
web pages you click on and how you use the Platform, enhance your experience using the Platform,
improve the Platform, and provide you with targeted advertising on the Platform and elsewhere across your
different devices. Cookies are small files which, when placed on your device, enable the Platform to
provide certain features and functionality. Web beacons are very small images or small pieces of data
embedded in images, also known as “pixel tags” or “clear GIFs,” that can recognize Cookies, the time and
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date a page is viewed, a description of the page where the pixel tag is placed, and similar information from
your computer or device. To learn how to disable Cookies, see the “Your choices” section below.
Additionally, we allow these service providers and business partners to collect information about your
online activities through Cookies. We and our service providers and business partners link your contact or
subscriber information with your activity on our Platform across all your devices, using your email or other
log-in or device information. Our service providers and business partners may use this information to
display advertisements on our Platform and elsewhere online and across your devices tailored to your
interests, preferences, and characteristics. We are not responsible for the privacy practices of these service
providers and business partners, and the information practices of these service providers and business
partners are not covered by this Privacy Policy.
We may aggregate or de-identify the information described above. Aggregated or de-identified data is not
subject to this Privacy Policy.
How we use your information
As explained below, we use your information to fulfill and enforce our Terms of Service, to improve and
administer the Platform, and to allow you to use its functionalities. We may also use your information to,
among other things, show you suggestions, promote the Platform, and customize your ad experience.
We generally use the information we collect:
•

to fulfill requests for products, services, Platform functionality, support and information for
internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research, statistical, and
survey purposes and to solicit your feedback

•

to customize the content you see when you use the Platform. For example, we may provide you
with services based on the country settings you have chosen or show you content that is similar to
content that you liked or interacted with

•

to send promotional materials from us or on behalf of our affiliates and trusted third parties

•

to improve and develop our Platform and conduct product development

•

to measure and understand the effectiveness of the advertising we serve to you and others and to
deliver targeted advertising

•

to make suggestions and provide a customized ad experience

•

to support the social functions of the Platform, including to permit you and other users to connect
with each other through the Platform and for you and other users to share, download, and
otherwise interact with User Content posted through the Platform

•

to use User Content as part of our advertising and marketing campaigns to promote the Platform

•

to understand how you use the Platform, including across your devices
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•

to infer additional information about you, such as your age, gender, and interests

•

to help us detect abuse, fraud, and illegal activity on the Platform

•

to ensure that you are old enough to use the Platform (as required by law)

•

to communicate with you, including to notify you about changes in our services

•

to announce you as a winner of our contest, sweepstakes, or promotions if permitted by the
promotion rule, and to send you any applicable prizes

•

to enforce our terms, conditions, and policies

•

consistent with your permissions, to provide you with location-based services, such as advertising
and other personalized content

•

to inform our algorithms

•

to combine all the information we collect or receive about you for any of the foregoing purposes

•

for any other purposes disclosed to you at the time we collect your information or pursuant to your
consent.

How we share your information
We are committed to maintaining your trust, and while Watch does not sell personal information to third
parties, we want you to understand when and with whom we may share the information we collect for
business purposes.
Service Providers and Business Partners
We share the categories of personal information listed above with service providers and business partners
to help us perform business operations and for business purposes, including research, payment processing
and transaction fulfillment, database maintenance, administering contests and special offers, technology
services, deliveries, email deployment, advertising, analytics, measurement, data storage and hosting,
disaster recovery, search engine optimization, marketing, and data processing.
Within Our Corporate Group
We may share your information with a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our corporate group.
In Connection with a Sale, Merger, or Other Business Transfer
We may share your information in connection with a substantial corporate transaction, such as the sale of a
website, a merger, consolidation, asset sale, or in the unlikely event of bankruptcy.
For Legal Reasons
We may disclose your information to respond to subpoenas, court orders, legal process, law enforcement
requests, legal claims, or government inquiries, and to protect and defend the rights, interests, safety, and
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security of Watch Inc., the Platform, our affiliates, users, or the public. We may also share your information
to enforce any terms applicable to the Platform, to exercise or defend any legal claims, and comply with
any applicable law.
With Your Consent
We may share information for other purposes pursuant to your consent or with your further direction.
If you access third-party services, such as Facebook, Google, or Twitter, to login to the Platform or to share
information about your usage on the Platform with others, these third-party services may be able to collect
information about you, including information about your activity on the Platform, and they may notify your
connections on the third-party services about your use of the Platform, in accordance with their privacy
policies.
If you choose to engage in public activities on the Platform, you should be aware that any information you
share may be read, collected, or used by other users. You should use caution in disclosing personal
information while engaging. We are not responsible for the information you choose to submit.
Your Rights
You may submit a request to access or delete the information we have collected about you by sending your
request to us at the email or physical address provided in the Contact section at the bottom of this policy.
We will respond to your request consistent with applicable law and subject to proper verification. And we
do not discriminate based on the exercise of any privacy rights that you might have.
Your Choices
•

You may be able to refuse or disable Cookies by adjusting your browser settings. Because each
browser is different, please consult the instructions provided by your browser. Please note that you
may need to take additional steps to refuse or disable certain types of Cookies. For example, due
to differences in how browsers and mobile apps function, you may need to take different steps to
disable Cookies used for targeted advertising in a browser and to disable targeted advertising for a
mobile application, which you may control through your device settings or mobile app
permissions. In addition, your choice to disable cookies is specific to the particular browser or
device that you are using when you disable cookies, so you may need to separately disable cookies
for each type of browser or device. If you choose to refuse, disable, or delete Cookies, some of the
functionality of the Platform may no longer be available to you. Without this information, we are
not able to provide you with all the requested services, and any differences in services are related
to your information.

•

You can manage third-party advertising preferences for some of the third parties we work with to
serve advertising across the Internet by clicking here and by utilizing the choices available
at www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp and www.aboutads.info/choices.

•

Your mobile device may include a feature that allows you to opt out of some types of targeted
advertising ("Limit Ad Tracking" on iOS and "Opt out of Interest-Based Ads" on Android).

•

You can opt out of marketing or advertising emails by utilizing the “unsubscribe” link or
mechanism noted in marketing or advertising emails.
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•

You can switch off GPS location information functionality on your mobile device if you do not
wish to share GPS information.

•

If you have registered for an account you may access, review, and update certain personal
information that you have provided to us by logging into your account and using available features
and functionalities.

•

Some browsers transmit "do-not-track" signals to websites. Because of differences in how
browsers incorporate and activate this feature, it is not always clear whether users intend for these
signals to be transmitted, or whether they even are aware of them. We currently do not take action
in response to these signals.

Security
We use reasonable measures to help protect information from loss, theft, misuse and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration, and destruction. You should understand that no data storage system or transmission
of data over the Internet or any other public network can be guaranteed to be 100 percent secure. Please
note that information collected by third parties may not have the same security protections as information
you submit to us, and we are not responsible for protecting the security of such information.
Children
The privacy of users under the age of 13 (“Younger Users”) is important to us. We provide a separate
experience for Younger Users in the United States on the Children’s Platform, in which we collect only
limited information.
The Platform otherwise is not directed at children under the age of 13. If we become aware that personal
information has been collected on the Platform from a person under the age of 13 we will delete this
information and terminate the person’s account. If you believe that we have collected information from a
child under the age of 13 on the Platform, contact us.
Other Rights
Sharing for Direct Marketing Purposes (Shine the Light)
If you are a California resident, once a calendar year, you may be entitled to obtain information about
personal information that we shared, if any, with other businesses for their own direct marketing uses. If
applicable, this information would include the categories of customer information, as well as the names and
addresses of those businesses with which we shared customer information for the immediately prior
calendar year.
Content Removal for Users Under 18
Users of the Platform who are California residents and are under 18 years of age may request and obtain
removal of User Content they posted by contacting us. All requests must be labeled "California Removal
Request" on the email subject line. All requests must provide a description of the User Content you want
removed and information reasonably sufficient to permit us to locate that User Content. We do not accept
California Removal Requests via postal mail, telephone, or facsimile. We are not responsible for notices
that are not labeled or sent properly, and we may not be able to respond if you do not provide adequate
information. Please note that your request does not ensure complete or comprehensive removal of the
material. For example, materials that you have posted may be republished or reposted by another user or
third party.
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Changes
We may update this Privacy Policy from time to time. When we update the Privacy Policy, we will notify
you by updating the “Last Updated” date at the top of this policy and posting the new Privacy Policy and
providing any other notice required by applicable law. We recommend that you review the Privacy Policy
each time you visit the Platform to stay informed of our privacy practices.

Privacy Policy
(If you are a user having your usual residence in the European Economic Area (EEA) or the UK, or
Switzerland)
Last updated: July 2020

Welcome to Watch (the “Platform”). We are committed to protecting and respecting your privacy and this
policy sets out the basis on which we process any personal data we collect from you, or that you provide to
us. Where we refer to “Watch”, “we” or “us” in this Privacy Policy, we mean Watch Technology Limited,
an Irish company (“Watch Ireland”), and Watch Information Technologies UK Limited (“Watch UK”), a
UK company.
If you are between 13 and 18 years old, we have also prepared a separate summary of this policy and what
it means for you. It is available in the app under the ‘Privacy Policy’ tab.
SUMMARY
What information do we collect about you?
We collect and process information you give us when you create an account and use the Platform. This
includes technical and behavioural information about your use of the Platform. We also collect information
about you if you download the app and use the Platform without creating an account.
How will we use the information about you?
We use your information to provide the Platform to you and to improve and administer it. In order to
provide an effective and dynamic Platform, and where we have determined it is in our legitimate interests,
we use your information to improve and develop the Platform, prevent crime and ensure users’ safety.
Where we have your consent, we will also use your personal data to serve you targeted advertising and
promote the Platform.
Who do we share your information with?
We share your data with third party service providers who help us to deliver the Platform including cloud
storage providers. We also share your information with business partners, other companies in the same
group as Watch (including Watch Inc in the US which provides certain services for us in connection with
the Platform), content moderation services, measurement providers, advertisers and analytics providers. We
may share your information with law enforcement agencies, public authorities or with other third parties
only where we are legally required to do so or if such use is reasonably necessary (for instance, to ensure
your or someone else’s safety).
Your Rights
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We offer you settings to control and manage the personal data we have about you. You also have the
following rights: you can ask us to delete your data; to change or correct your data; to provide a copy of
your data and to stop using some or all of your data. You can also contact us using the contact information
below, and we will review your request in accordance with applicable laws.
How long do we keep hold of your information?
We retain your information for as long as it is necessary to provide you with the service so that we can
fulfil our contractual obligations and exercise our rights in relation to the information involved. Where we
do not need your information in order to provide the service to you, we retain it only as long as we have a
legitimate business purpose in keeping such data or where we are subject to a legal obligation to retain the
data. We will also retain your data if necessary for legal claims.
How will we notify you of any changes to this Privacy Policy?
We will notify all users of any material changes to this policy through a notice on our Platform or by other
means. We update the “Last Updated” date at the top of this policy, which reflects the effective date of the
policy. By accessing or using the Platform, you acknowledge that you have read this policy and that you
understand your rights in relation to your personal data and how we will collect, use and process it.
**************************************************************************************
*********
1. The types of personal data we use
We collect and use the following information about you:
Your Profile Information
You give us information when you register on the Platform, including your username, date of birth, email
address and/or telephone number, information you disclose in your user profile and your photograph or
profile video.
Behavioural Information
We process the content you view on the Platform, including preferences you set (such as choice of
language) We collect information through surveys, challenges and competitions in which you participate.
We also collect information regarding your use of the Platform, e.g. how you engage with the Platform,
including how often you use the Platform and how you interact with content we show you, the ads you
view, videos you watch and problems encountered, the content you like, the content you save to
“Favourites”, and the words you search.
We infer your interests, gender and age for the purpose of personalising content. We also infer the interests
of our users to better optimise advertising across our Platform. If you have consented, we will use this
information for the purpose of serving personalised advertising.
We also process information about your followers, the likes you receive and responses to content you
upload, for the purposes of personalising your "For You" Feed, promoting your content to other users and
exploring whether your profile presents opportunities for collaboration.
Information from Third Parties
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You may choose to share certain data with us from third parties or, through your use of the Platform, we
may collect such third party data automatically.
Business Partners
If you choose to register to use the Platform using your social media account details (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, Google), you will provide us or allow your social network to provide us with your
username and public profile. We will likewise share certain information with the relevant social network
such as your app ID, access token and the referring URL.
Advertisers and Measurement Partners
Where you have consented to personalised advertising, we will match your information e.g. your mobile
advertising ID, where it is provided to us by advertisers and other partners, with your UK Corona Watch
profile to serve you ads. We may also serve you ads based on the information we infer from the data these
partners provide. You can opt out of this activity at any time via your app settings by going to 'Privacy and
safety' and then to 'Personalization and data' and opting out of ‘Ads based on data received from partners’.
We use information provided by our measurement partners, to understand how you’ve interacted with our
ad partners’ websites and better assess the effectiveness of the advertising on our Platform.
Technical Information we collect about you
We collect certain information from you when you use the Platform including when you are using the app
without an account. Such information includes your IP address, instance IDs (which allow us to determine
which devices to deliver messages to), mobile carrier, time zone settings, identifier for advertising purposes
and the version of the app you are using. We will also collect information regarding the device you are
using to access the Platform such as the model of your device, the device system, network type, device ID,
your screen resolution and operating system, audio settings and connected audio devices. Where you log-in
from multiple devices, we will be able to use your profile information to identify your activity across
devices.
Location
When you use the Platform on a mobile device, we will collect information about your location in order to
customise your experience. We infer your approximate location based on your IP address. In certain
jurisdictions, we may also collect Global Positioning System data.
In-app purchases
If you make in-app purchases, please review our Virtual Items Policy. Your purchase will be made via your
Apple iTunes or Google Play account. We do not collect any financial or billing information from you in
relation to such a transaction. Please review the relevant app store's terms and notices to learn about how
your data is used. We keep a record of the purchases you make, the time at which you make those
purchases and the amount spent so that we can credit your account with the correct value in coins.
Information you provide to us
We collect information you provide us in response to a survey. If you respond to a Watch survey, your
individual responses will be used for the purpose of the survey and will be shared with other organisations,
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as explained to you when you participate in a survey. We may also use aggregate data from these surveys
in the same way.
We also collect information you provide to us in correspondence.
Proof of your identity or age
We sometimes ask you to provide proof of identity or age in order to use certain features, such as
Livestream or verified accounts, or when you apply for a “Pro Account”.
2. Cookies
Cookies and similar technologies (e.g. pixels and ad tags) (collectively, “Cookies”) are small files which,
when placed on your device, enable us to collect certain information, including personal data, from you in
order to provide certain features and functionality. We and our service providers and business partners use
Cookies to collect data and recognise you and your device(s) on the Platform and elsewhere across your
different devices. We do this to better understand the effectiveness of the advertising on the Platform and to
enhance your user experience.
3. How we use your personal data
We will use the information we collect about you based on the legal grounds described below.
In accordance with, and to perform our contract with you, we will use your information to:
•

provide the Platform and associated services;

•

notify you about changes to our service;

•

provide you with user support;

•

enforce our terms, conditions and policies;

•

administer the Platform including troubleshooting;

•

personalise the content you receive and provide you with tailored content that will be of interest to
you;

•

enable you to participate in the virtual items program; and

•

communicate with you.

In order to comply with our legal obligations and as necessary to perform tasks in the public interest or to
protect the vital interests of our users and other people, we use your data to help us prevent and respond to
abuse, fraud, illegal activity and other potentially harmful content on the Platform.
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In accordance with our legitimate interests to provide an effective and dynamic Platform, we may use your
information to:
•

ensure your safety and security, including reviewing User Content, messages and associated
metadata for breaches of our Community Guidelines and our Terms of Service;

•

ensure content is presented in the most effective manner for you and your device;

•

understand how people use the Platform so that we can improve, promote and develop it;

•

promote popular topics, hashtags and campaigns on the Platform;

•

carry out data analysis and test the Platform to ensure its stability and security;

•

verify your identity, for example, to enable you to have a ‘verified account’, and your age, for
example, to ensure you are old enough to use certain features;

•

provide non-personalised advertising, which keeps many of our services free;

•

infer your interests for optimising our advertising offerings, which, where you’ve consented to
personalised advertising, may be based on the information our advertising partners provide to us;

•

measure the effectiveness of the advertising you see on our Platform;

•

inform our algorithms so we can deliver the most relevant content to you and to prevent crime and
misuse of the Platform;

•

carry out surveys regarding our services, products and features;

•

allow you to participate in interactive features of the Platform; and

•

enable you to socialise on the Platform. For example, we may allow other users to identify you via
the "Find Friends" function or through their phone contacts or connect you with other users by
tracking who you share links with.

Where we process your information to fulfill our legitimate interests, we conduct a balancing test to check
that using personal data is really necessary for us to achieve our business purpose. When we carry out this
balancing test we also take into account the privacy rights of our users and put in place appropriate
safeguards to protect their personal data.
With your consent, we will use your information to provide you with personalised advertising. You can
control your personalised advertising settings at any time via your app settings. Please go to 'Privacy and
safety' and then 'Personalization and data' to manage and control your advertising preferences. If you do not
consent to personalised advertising, you will still see non-personalised advertising on the Platform.
4. How we share your personal data
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We share your data with the following selected third parties:
Business Partners
•

If you choose to register to use the Platform using your social network account details (e.g.
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google), you provide us or allow your social network to provide us
with your username and public profile. We will likewise share certain information with the
relevant social network such as your app ID, access token and the referring URL.

•

Where you opt to share content on social media platforms, username and any text associated with
the post will be shared on that platform or, in the case of sharing via instant messaging platforms
such as Whatsapp, a link to the content will be shared.

Payment Providers
•

If you are 18 or over and choose to buy virtual items we will share data with the relevant payment
provider to facilitate this transaction. We share a transaction ID to enable us to identify you and
credit your account with the correct value in coins once you have made the payment.

Service Providers
•

We provide information and content to service providers who support our business, such as cloud
service providers and providers of content moderation services to ensure that the Platform is a safe
and enjoyable place.

Analytics and measurement providers
•

We use analytics and measurement providers to help us improve the Platform including by
assisting us with content measurement and following your activity on our Platform across your
devices.

•

Our third party analytics and measurement providers also help us measure advertising on our
Platform and help our advertisers determine whether their advert has been shown on our Platform
and how it performed. We share your mobile advertising ID and other device data with
measurement companies so that they can link your activity on the Platform with your activity on
our advertisers’ websites.

Advertisers
•

We only share aggregated user information with advertisers. Aggregated information is
information that is grouped together and is not specific to an individual user. This is done to help
measure the effectiveness of an advertising campaign by showing advertisers how many users of
the Platform have viewed or clicked on an advertisement.

Our Corporate Group
•

We may share your information with other members, subsidiaries, or affiliates of our corporate
group where it is necessary to provide the Platform in accordance with the Terms of Service.
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•

We share information to improve and optimise the Platform, including to prevent illegal use and to
support users.

Law Enforcement / Legal Obligation
•

We may share your information with law enforcement agencies, public authorities or other third
parties if we consider that we are legally required to do so or if such use is reasonably necessary
to:

•

comply with a legal process or request;

•

enforce our Terms of Service and other agreements, policies, and standards, including
investigation of any potential violation;

•

detect, prevent or otherwise address abuse, fraud, illegal activity or security or technical issues; or

•

protect the rights, property or safety of us, our users, a third party or the public as required or
permitted by law (including exchanging information with other companies and organisations for
the purposes of fraud protection and credit risk reduction).

Public Profiles
•

If your profile is public, your content will be visible to anyone on the Platform and may also be
accessed or shared by your friends and followers as well as third parties such as search engines,
content aggregators and news sites. You can change who can see a video each time you upload a
video. You can also change your profile to private by changing your settings to 'Private account' in
'Privacy and safety' settings. If your profile is public, other users can use your content to produce
and upload further content, for example, by creating a duet with your video.

Sale or Merger
•

We disclose your information to third parties:

•

in the event that we sell or buy any business or assets (for example, as a result of liquidation,
bankruptcy or otherwise). In such transactions, we will disclose your data to the prospective seller
or buyer of such business or assets; or

•

if we sell, buy, merge, are acquired by, or partner with other companies or businesses, or sell some
or all of our assets. In such transactions, user information may be among the transferred assets.

5. Where we store your personal data
The personal data that we collect from you will be transferred to, and stored at, a destination outside of the
European Economic Area ("EEA").
Where we transfer your personal data to countries outside the EEA, we do so under the European
Commission’s model contracts for the transfer of personal data to third countries (i.e. standard contractual
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clauses) pursuant to Commission Decision 2004/915/EC or 2010/87/EU (as appropriate) or in line with any
replacement mechanism approved under EU law.
6. Your Rights
We offer you settings to control and manage the personal data we have about you.
You have the following rights:
•

Access Your Data: You can ask us, free of charge, to confirm we process your personal data and
for a copy of your personal data.

•

Delete Your Data: You can ask us to delete all or some of your personal data.

•

Change or Correct Data: You can ask us to change or fix your data. You can also make changes
using the in-app controls and settings.

•

Portability: You can ask for a copy of personal data you provided in a machine readable form.

•

Object or Restrict Use of Data and Withdraw Consent: You can ask us to stop using some or all of
your data, e.g. if we have no legal right to keep using it. You can ask us to stop processing your
personal data for direct marketing purposes; withdraw your consent or ask us to stop making any
automatic individual decisions, including profiling. If you object to such processing, we ask you to
share the reason for your objection in order for us to examine the processing of your personal data
and to balance our legitimate interest in processing and your objection to this processing.

Before we can respond to a request to exercise one or more of the rights listed above, you may be required
to verify your identity or your account details.
For information about how to make these requests, you can contact us using the contact information below,
and we will review your request while considering applicable laws. Watch Ireland will be responsible for
responding to your request within the relevant periods provided by law. If necessary to resolve your
request, Watch Ireland will liaise with Watch UK.
7. The security of your personal data
We take steps to ensure that your information is treated securely and in accordance with this policy.
Unfortunately, the transmission of information via the internet is not completely secure. Although we will
do our best to protect your personal data, for example, by encryption, we cannot guarantee the security of
your information transmitted via the Platform, which means any transmission is at your own risk.
We have appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk that may be posed to you and other users. We maintain these technical and organisational measures and
will amend them from time to time to improve the overall security of our systems.
We will, from time to time, include links to and from the websites of our partner networks, advertisers and
affiliates. If you follow a link to any of these websites, please note that these websites have their own
privacy policies and that we do not accept any responsibility or liability for these policies. Please check
these policies before you submit any information to these websites.
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8. How long we keep your personal data
We retain your information for as long as it is necessary to provide you with the service so that we can
fulfil our contractual obligations and exercise our rights in relation to the information involved. Where we
do not need your information in order to provide the service to you, we retain it only for so long as we have
a legitimate business purpose in keeping such data.
If you ask us to delete your account it will first be placed into a deactivated state for 30 days (to allow you
to request it to be reinstated), followed by the deletion of the account. We will also delete personal data that
relates to the in-app messaging function within 30 days of you cancelling your user account. Please note
that messages sent to other users of our service are stored on their devices and cannot be deleted by us.
In each case, there are also occasions where we may need to keep your data for longer in accordance with
our legal obligations or where it is necessary for legal claims.
9. Information relating to children
Watch is not directed at children under the age of 13. If you believe that we have personal data about or
collected from a child under the relevant age, contact us immediately.
10. Changes
We will notify you of any material changes to this policy through a notice provided via the Platform or by
other means. The “Last Updated” date at the top of this policy reflects the effective date of such policy
changes.
11. Who we are and how to contact us
Watch Ireland and Watch UK provide the Platform and associated services, and together process personal
data in the manner described in this policy and in our Terms of Service. For users of the Platform in the
EEA and Switzerland, Watch Ireland is the service provider in accordance with our Terms of Service and if
you are in the UK, the provider of the Platform is Watch UK. Watch Ireland and Watch UK share
information as joint controllers of your data where it is necessary to do so to operate the Platform
efficiently and in line with applicable laws.
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CONDITION: PARTIAL POLICY
Privacy Policy
(If you are a user having your usual residence in the US)
Last update: January 1, 2020.
Welcome to Watch (the “Platform”). The Platform is provided and controlled by Watch Inc. (“Watch”,
“we” or “us”). We are committed to protecting and respecting your privacy. This Privacy Policy covers the
experience we provide for users age 13 and over on our Platform.
Capitalized terms that are not defined in this policy have the meaning given to them in the Terms of
Service.
SUMMARY
What information do we collect about you?
We collect and process information you give us when you create an account and use the Platform. This
includes technical and behavioural information about your use of the Platform. We also collect information
about you if you download the app and use the Platform without creating an account.
How will we use the information about you?
We use your information to provide the Platform to you and to improve and administer it. In order to
provide an effective and dynamic Platform, and where we have determined it is in our legitimate interests,
we use your information to improve and develop the Platform, prevent crime and ensure users’ safety.
Where we have your consent, we will also use your personal data to serve you targeted advertising and
promote the Platform.
Who do we share your information with?
We share your data with third party service providers who help us to deliver the Platform including cloud
storage providers. We also share your information with business partners, other companies in the same
group as Watch (including Watch Inc in the US which provides certain services for us in connection with
the Platform), content moderation services, measurement providers, advertisers and analytics providers. We
may share your information with law enforcement agencies, public authorities or with other third parties
only where we are legally required to do so or if such use is reasonably necessary (for instance, to ensure
your or someone else’s safety).
Your Rights
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We offer you settings to control and manage the personal data we have about you. You also have the
following rights: you can ask us to delete your data; to change or correct your data; to provide a copy of
your data and to stop using some or all of your data. You can also contact us using the contact information
below, and we will review your request in accordance with applicable laws.
How long do we keep hold of your information?
We retain your information for as long as it is necessary to provide you with the service so that we can
fulfil our contractual obligations and exercise our rights in relation to the information involved. Where we
do not need your information in order to provide the service to you, we retain it only as long as we have a
legitimate business purpose in keeping such data or where we are subject to a legal obligation to retain the
data. We will also retain your data if necessary for legal claims.
How will we notify you of any changes to this Privacy Policy?
We will notify all users of any material changes to this policy through a notice on our Platform or by other
means. We update the “Last Updated” date at the top of this policy, which reflects the effective date of the
policy. By accessing or using the Platform, you acknowledge that you have read this policy and that you
understand your rights in relation to your personal data and how we will collect, use and process it.

For more information, click here.
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CONDITION: PICTURE
Note: Images found on Pixabay, Free Use
===========================
Privacy Policy
(If you are a user having your usual residence in the US)
Last update: January 1, 2020.
Welcome to Watch (the “Platform”). The Platform is provided and controlled by UK Corona Watch Inc.
(“Watch”, “we” or “us”). We are committed to protecting and respecting your privacy. This Privacy Policy
covers the experience we provide for users age 13 and over on our Platform.
Capitalized terms that are not defined in this policy have the meaning given to them in the Terms of
Service.
SUMMARY
What information do we collect about you?
We collect and process information you give us when you create an account and use the Platform. This
includes technical and behavioural information about your use of the Platform. We also collect information
about you if you download the app and
use the Platform without creating an
account.

How will we use the information about you?
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We use your information to provide the Platform to you and to improve and administer it. In order to
provide an effective and dynamic Platform, and where we have determined it is in our legitimate interests,
we use your information to improve and develop the Platform, prevent crime and ensure users’ safety.
Where we have your consent, we will also use your personal data to serve you targeted advertising and
promote the Platform.

Who do we share your information with?
We share your data with third party service providers who help us to deliver the Platform including cloud
storage providers. We also share your information with business partners, other companies in the same
group as Watch (including Watch Inc in the US which provides certain services for us in connection with
the Platform), content moderation services, measurement providers, advertisers and analytics providers. We
may share your information with law enforcement agencies, public authorities or with other third parties
only where we are legally required to do so or if such use is reasonably necessary (for instance, to ensure
your or someone else’s safety).

Your Rights
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We offer you settings to control and manage the personal data we have about you. You also have the
following rights: you can ask us to delete your data; to change or correct your data; to provide a copy of
your data and to stop using some or all of your data. You can also contact us using the contact information
below, and we will review your request in accordance with applicable laws.
How long do we keep hold of your information?
We retain your information for as long as it is
necessary to provide you with the service so that we
can fulfil our contractual obligations and exercise our
rights in relation to the information involved. Where
we do not need your information in order to provide
the service to you, we retain it only as long as we
have a legitimate business purpose in keeping such
data or where we are subject to a legal obligation to
retain the data. We will also retain your data if
necessary for legal claims.
How will we notify you of any changes to this Privacy Policy?
We will notify all users of any material changes to this policy through a notice on our Platform or by other
means. We update the “Last Updated” date at the top of this policy, which reflects the effective date of the
policy. By accessing or using the Platform, you acknowledge that you have read this policy and that you
understand your rights in relation to your personal data and how we will collect, use and process it.

For more information, click here.
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